{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"climate_tags":["food price"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":17,"relation":"eq"},"page":1,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?climate_tags=food+price","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"cliinstca-000265","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/cliinstca-000265","title":"Industrial carbon pricing is not the reason for food inflation","publisher":{"name":"Canadian Climate Institute","organization":"canadian-climate-institute"},"document_type":"statement","language":"en","date_published":"2026-03-23","source_url":"https://climateinstitute.ca/industrial-carbon-pricing-not-reason-food-inflation/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Canadian Climate Institute asserts that industrial carbon pricing has a negligible effect on food prices, estimated at most at 0.1 per cent. The author explains that the policy does not apply to individuals, farmers, or transport companies, and is designed to limit costs for large industrial emitters through thresholds and carbon credits. The text identifies the actual drivers of food inflation as supply chain disruptions, labour shortages, U.S. trade policy, and climate-driven weather extremes such as droughts in Western Canada.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cliinstca-000265#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Analysis by the Canadian Climate Institute indicates that industrial carbon pricing's effect on food prices is minimal, estimated at a maximum of 0.1 per cent, which represents 1/48th of the current food inflation rate.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cliinstca-000265#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Industrial carbon pricing does not directly increase food costs because it does not apply to individuals, farmers, or transport companies, and much of Canada's food is imported and thus unaffected by domestic carbon pricing.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cliinstca-000265#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The design of industrial carbon pricing limits costs for industry by only charging for emissions that exceed a specific threshold and allowing companies to profit from selling carbon credits if they reduce emissions below that threshold.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cliinstca-000265#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Carbon pricing has a negligible impact on the cost of oil and steel; for example, a $170 carbon price on steel would add less than $16 to the cost of a Chevy Silverado, or approximately 0.03 per cent of the base model price.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cliinstca-000265#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The primary drivers of food inflation are identified as supply chain disruptions, labour shortages, disruptive U.S. trade policy, and climate change, specifically citing drought in Western Canada affecting beef prices and heat damaging coffee crops.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cliinstca-000265#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food price","emission trading","carbon credit","climate change","supply chain","agriculture"],"geography_discussed":["Quebec","Alberta","United States","Western Canada"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]},{"id":"zca-000114","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/zca-000114","title":"Technical appendix for Climate extremes in the UK are driving up lamb prices for consumers","publisher":{"name":"Zero Carbon Analytics","organization":"zero-carbon-analytics"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2026-03","source_url":"https://zerocarbon-analytics.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Technical-Appendix-Climate-extremes-in-the-UK-are-driving-up-lamb-prices-for-consumers-2026-03.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document details a rolling-window ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model used to analyze the impact of climate extremes on UK lamb prices. It finds that both short-term drought (6-month window) and prolonged wet conditions (12-month window) drive prices up, while a 'pork falsification test' confirms this mechanism is specific to grass-fed lamb. Robustness checks, including CPI deflation and out-of-sample prediction, support the validity of the climate transmission signal. The analysis specifically isolates a 'drought premium' of 92p/kg farmgate for the 2025 drought and notes that the hay market's sensitivity to rainfall anomalies has strengthened over time.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"zca-000114#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The core model identifies two distinct rainfall-driven price pressures: drier conditions over a 6-month horizon push prices up (coefficient -0.00644, NW P = 0.006), while prolonged wet conditions over a 12-month horizon also increase prices (coefficient +0.00852, NW P = 0.010).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"zca-000114#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A 'pork falsification test' used as a negative control demonstrated that rainfall has no statistically significant predictive power for pork prices, confirming that the observed price increases in lamb are linked to the grass-fed supply chain rather than general economic trends.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"zca-000114#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The UK lamb market is largely self-contained, as the addition of the FAO global ovine meat price index to the model resulted in the index being non-significant (P = 0.50) and had negligible impact on rainfall coefficients.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"zca-000114#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of the 2025 drought, using a counterfactual to isolate its effect from the preceding wet winter, found a mean drought premium of 92p/kg farmgate from March to October 2025, which equates to GBP 2.47 per household over that period.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"zca-000114#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While there is no evidence that grass growth sensitivity to rainfall is worsening over time (P = 0.63), the hay market shows a significant rainfall x year interaction (P = 0.007), indicating that hay price responses to rainfall anomalies have strengthened.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"zca-000114#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["drought","extreme weather event","food price"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["econometric modeling","robustness testing","counterfactual analysis"]},{"id":"greeneur-000077","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/greeneur-000077","title":"Comment les Big Five de l'agriculture prospèrent en période de crise","publisher":{"name":"Green European Journal","organization":"green-european-journal"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"fr","date_published":"2026-02-05","source_url":"https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/comment-les-big-five-de-lagriculture-prosperent-en-periode-de-crise/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The 'Big Five' agricultural traders—ADM, Bunge, Cargill, COFCO, and LDC (collectively ABCCD)—dominate the global trade of staples like grains, corn, soy, and sugar, controlling 70% to 90% of the commercial grain trade. During the 2021-2022 food price surge, these companies saw net profits increase by 200% to 300% compared to the 2016-2020 average. The author contends that this was achieved through strategic market consolidation, vertical integration, and inter-company cooperation, often facilitated by the EU's restrictive competition policy, which focuses primarily on immediate consumer prices rather than cumulative social harm. The document highlights the recent approval of the $34 billion Bunge-Viterra merger as evidence of regulatory failure and advocates for a transition toward an economy based on degrowth and decarbonization to dismantle the incentives for market concentration.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000077#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Five multinational companies, known as the ABCCD (Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill, China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation, and Louis Dreyfus Company), hold a near-monopoly on global staples and control between 70% and 90% of the commercial grain trade.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000077#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The ABCCD experienced a dramatic increase in net profits during the 2021-2022 food crisis, with gains ranging from 200% to 300% compared to the stable period of 2016-2020.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000077#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The European Union's competition policy is described as under-utilized and restrictive, having blocked fewer than 1% of notified concentrations since 1990 and approving 60 merger and acquisition cases involving the Big Five.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000077#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The ABCCD employ three primary strategies to maintain market dominance: market consolidation through mergers and acquisitions, vertical integration across the value chain (from seeds to transport), and interconnection through joint ventures and shared technology like the Covantis blockchain platform.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000077#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The companies' ability to influence prices is bolstered by their massive grain storage capacities, which allow them to withhold stocks until prices peak.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000077#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The EU Commission's approval of the $34 billion merger between Bunge and Viterra, without an in-depth investigation, is cited as a failure of regulatory oversight despite warnings from the Canadian Competition Bureau regarding anti-competitive effects.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000077#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food price"],"geography_discussed":["European Union","Brazil","France","Portugal","Ukraine","United States","Romania","South Korea","Canada","People's Republic of China"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","economic critique"]},{"id":"climcent-000113","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/climcent-000113","title":"Analysis: Climate change influenced unusual October heat in Japan","publisher":{"name":"Climate Central","organization":"climate-central"},"document_type":"fact sheet","language":"en","date_published":"2024-10-09","source_url":"https://www.climatecentral.org/climate-shift-index-alert/japan-oct-2024","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Between October 1 and 6, 2024, over 120 million people in Japan experienced unusual heat that was made at least 3 times more likely by human-caused climate change. At least 74 cities recorded temperatures of 30°C or higher, with conditions 5°C to 8°C above the 1991-2020 average. The analysis uses the Climate Shift Index (CSI), noting that 259 cities reached CSI level 3, while some cities like Kusatsu, Toyota, and Miyazaki reached CSI level 5, indicating an exceptional climate change event. The document also notes broader impacts of extreme heat in Japan, including a record 252 deaths in Tokyo from a summer heat wave, reduced agricultural output for vegetables, dairy, and fish, and delayed peak fall foliage in northern and eastern regions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"climcent-000113#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"During the first week of October 2024 (October 1-6), more than 120 million people in Japan faced unusual heat that human-caused climate change made at least 3 times more likely.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"climcent-000113#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"At least 74 Japanese cities recorded temperatures of 30°C or higher from October 1-6, 2024, with temperatures ranging from 5°C to 8°C above the 1991-2020 average.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"climcent-000113#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Climate Shift Index (CSI) showed a very strong climate change influence in 259 cities that reached CSI level 3. Some cities experienced an exceptional event at CSI level 5, including Kusatsu, Toyota, Miyazaki, and Okinawa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"climcent-000113#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Extreme heat in Japan has caused significant socio-economic and environmental disruptions, including a record 252 deaths in Tokyo between June and early September, increased food prices due to lower agricultural output of cucumbers, bell peppers, and eggplants, and a predicted delay of over 10 days for fall foliage in Nagano and Sapporo.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"climcent-000113#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["extreme heat","extreme event attribution","food price","heat wave"],"geography_discussed":["Tokyo","Sapporo","Nagano"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["attribution analysis"]},{"id":"greeneur-000069","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/greeneur-000069","title":"How agricultures big five thrive in crisis","publisher":{"name":"Green European Journal","organization":"green-european-journal"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2024-08-26","source_url":"https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/how-agricultures-big-five-thrive-in-crisis/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The 'Big Five' agricultural commodity traders—ADM, Bunge, Cargill, COFCO, and LDC—dominate the global trade of staples like grains and oilseeds, controlling 70-90% of the commercial grain market. The author contends that these companies used the 2021-2022 food price spikes, driven partly by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to dramatically increase net profit margins, with profits in 2022 being 200-300% higher than the 2016-2020 average. This dominance is maintained through strategies of market consolidation (M&As), vertical integration across the value chain, and interconnectedness via joint ventures. The document criticizes EU competition regulators for a narrow focus on immediate consumer prices, which has led to the approval of nearly all M&A cases involving the Big Five, including the recent 34-billion-dollar Bunge-Viterra deal. The author concludes that while stronger anti-trust enforcement is necessary, a systemic shift toward degrowth and decolonization is required to dismantle the incentives for such concentration.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000069#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Five multinational companies—Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), and Louis Dreyfus Company (LDC)—collectively dominate the global agricultural commodity market, controlling between 70 and 90 per cent of the global trade in commercial grains.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000069#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'Big Five' experienced a massive surge in profitability during the 2021-2022 food crisis; net profits in 2022 were 200 to 300 per cent higher than the average for the 2016-2020 period.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000069#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The companies maintain market dominance through three primary strategies: market consolidation via mergers and acquisitions, vertical integration (controlling everything from seeds and loans to transport), and interconnectedness through joint ventures and shared technology platforms like Covantis.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000069#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"EU competition regulators have largely failed to prevent market concentration, approving nearly all M&A cases involving the Big Five because they focus narrowly on immediate consumer prices rather than cumulative societal harms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000069#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Big Five's control over the supply chain, including immense grain storage capacity, creates incentives to withhold stocks until prices peak, contributing to 'seller's inflation' where profit margins are increased during crises.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000069#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Recent anti-competitive behavior among the Big Five includes a 5 million dollar settlement by ADM for price-fixing in the US peanut sector and an 84.4 million dollar settlement by Cargill regarding poultry sector worker wages.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000069#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The European Commission approved the 34-billion-dollar merger between Bunge and Viterra on 1 August without a deep investigation, despite warnings from the Competition Bureau of Canada about substantial anti-competitive effects.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greeneur-000069#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food price","food security"],"geography_discussed":["European Union","United States","Canada","Brazil","Portugal","Romania","South Korea","People's Republic of China"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","economic critique"]},{"id":"afripo-000183","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/afripo-000183","title":"Nigeria’s foreign policy during President Buhari’s time in office","publisher":{"name":"Africa Policy Research Institute","organization":"africa-policy-research-institute"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2023-02-13","source_url":"https://afripoli.org/de/gruener-wasserstoff-potenziale-namibia-en","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the foreign policy of Nigeria under President Buhari, highlighting a lack of coherence between domestic goals and regional aspirations. Key issues discussed include the 2019 land border closures, which aimed to curb smuggling but increased food inflation and harmed regional trade; the delayed ratification of the AfCFTA due to domestic productivity concerns; and the decline of the oil sector caused by insecurity and poor governance, which deterred foreign direct investment. It also evaluates the role of the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM) in managing relations with Nigerians abroad amidst increasing economic migration.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000183#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The closure of land borders with Benin Republic, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in August 2019 created a conflict between Nigeria's goals for agricultural development and its regional relationships. While intended to stop the smuggling of drugs, arms, and petroleum, the policy led to a sharp increase in food inflation, rising from 13.51 per cent in September 2019 to 19.56 per cent by December 2020.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000183#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The border closure negatively impacted the informal sector in West Africa, where informal employment accounts for 90 per cent of jobs and 50 per cent of GDP. This caused significant losses in household incomes and tax revenues for smaller neighboring countries, violating ECOWAS agreements on freedom of movement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000183#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Nigeria was among the last countries to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) because local manufacturers and traders feared that high business costs and low productivity would make Nigerian goods uncompetitive. Productivity is hindered by inadequate mechanisation, irregular electricity, and environmental issues like annual flooding and desertification in the north.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000183#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite productivity challenges in goods, Nigeria's service sector†which contributes 46 per cent of GDP and employs 53.1 per cent of the population–is well-positioned to benefit from the AfCFTA, particularly in ICT, financial services, and cultural exports like film and music.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000183#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Foreign direct investment in Nigeria's oil sector has been severely hindered by domestic insecurity and poor governance. Daily production fell from 1.49 million barrels in 2020 to 1.14 million in 2022, exacerbated by the fact that approximately 20 per cent of daily production is stolen through pipeline vandalism and bunkering.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000183#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM), established in May 2019, provides essential damage control and assistance–such as responding to 2019 xenophobic attacks in South Africa and evacuations from Ukraine–but lacks the power to prevent abuses or resolve systemic issues like passport bribery and delays.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000183#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["trade policy","food price","desertification","flood"],"geography_discussed":["Benin Republic","Chad","Niger","Cameroon","South Africa","Ukraine","European Union","Morocco"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","economic assessment"]},{"id":"prio-001545","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001545","title":"Protest and Insecurity: Trends in the Global South since the Russian Invasion of Ukraine","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2022-03","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/efdbb4c1-aa3e-4783-a7bf-a913a266535e/Marsh Rudolfsen Rustad - Protest and Insecurity Trends in the Global South since the Russian Invasion of Ukraine - Conflict Trends 3-2022.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document identifies a substantial increase in protests in the Global South after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, driven by food and energy insecurity. Analyzing ACLED data, the authors found food protests in 32 countries and fuel protests in 37 countries. While many protests are isolated, in some nations—such as Paraguay, Guatemala, and Peru—these grievances constituted a significant portion of all unrest events. The report argues that such protests serve as warnings of household hardship and can lead to severe political consequences, citing the flight of Sri Lanka's president as an example.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001545#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Global South saw a substantial increase in protests that exceeded pre-invasion levels, while other types of violence remained largely stable.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001545#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Between February 24 and May 13, 2022, food or fuel protests were identified in 48 states in the Global South; specifically, food protests occurred in 32 countries and fuel protests in 37, with 24 countries experiencing both.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001545#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Fuel protests were particularly politically significant in eight countries where they represented more than 10% of all protests; this included Guatemala (48%), Peru (41%), Trinidad and Tobago (40%), Indonesia (21%), Panama (21%), and Honduras (20%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001545#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Paraguay, fuel price grievances were highly prevalent, appearing in 65% of the 448 protests recorded between February 24 and May 13, 2022.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001545#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The combination of economic and political grievances can lead to major political instability, as evidenced by mass protests in Sri Lanka that resulted in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fleeing the country on July 13, 2022.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001545#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Middle-income states in Asia and the Americas are identified as more vulnerable to these protests because they rely more on imported food and have transportation sectors sensitive to fuel price increases.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001545#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food insecurity","food price"],"geography_discussed":["Paraguay","Sri Lanka","Guatemala","Peru","Trinidad and Tobago","Indonesia","Honduras","Panama","Turkey","India","Brazil","Colombia","Chile","Cameroon","Sudan","Mauritius","South Africa","Tunisia","Morocco","Pakistan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["trend analysis","case study"]},{"id":"prio-001387","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001387","title":"Fighting For Food? Investigating Food Insecurity as a Source of Urban Unrest","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2021","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/76ac297f-3b58-4bca-b0f8-62ea119b9ac7/Fighting For Food Investigating Food Insecurity as a Source of Urban Unrest.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research argues that while food insecurity provides the motivation for urban unrest, the actual occurrence of collective action is contingent on the presence of organizational networks and the level of state repression. Using a combination of cross-national data from urban Africa (1990–2014) and individual-level survey data from Johannesburg, the author finds that food insecurity increases the likelihood of unrest, particularly demonstrations and strikes. However, the study challenges the notion that food is a uniquely potent driver of unrest compared to other living expenses and finds no evidence that food insecurity leads specifically to more violent behavior.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001387#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The relationship between increasing food prices and urban unrest is moderated by state repression of societal organizations; countries with moderate repression and barriers to formation are more likely to experience unrest than those with highly repressed organizational environments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001387#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Individual-level data from Johannesburg indicates that higher experienced intensity of food insecurity predicts participation in urban unrest, with the strongest effects seen for demonstrations and strikes rather than violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001387#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Organizational networks, particularly union ties, act as catalysts that increase the likelihood of unrest participation among food-insecure individuals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001387#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Experimental evidence suggests that food price hikes are not a more potent driver for the willingness to engage in unrest than other essential living expenses, such as fuel or electricity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001387#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The research rejects the common assumption that food insecurity leads to a 'hungry, angry crowd' that engages in violence out of desperation, finding instead that the most aggrieved use legal collective action methods.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001387#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Societal organizations facilitate unrest by providing existing mobilization structures and by politicizing individual-level food grievances into group phenomena.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001387#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food insecurity","food price","urbanization"],"geography_discussed":["Soweto","Alexandra","Egypt","Bangladesh","India","North Korea"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["literature review","quantitative analysis","vignette experiment","survey research"]},{"id":"bc3res-000164","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/bc3res-000164","title":"Industrial and terrestrial carbon leakage under climate policy fragmentation","publisher":{"name":"Basque Centre for Climate Change","organization":"basque-centre-for-climate-change"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2016-02","source_url":"https://www.bc3research.org/h6T8Uy8Nm4gFs0O/201603311208301529793418.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study examines how fragmented climate policies, where some regions implement carbon taxes while others do not, lead to 'carbon leakage'—the relocation of emissions to non-participating regions. It distinguishes between industrial carbon leakage (ICL), driven by fossil fuel price changes, and terrestrial carbon leakage (TCL), driven by land-use changes. The findings indicate that TCL is the dominant form of leakage until 2050, primarily due to deforestation in non-participating regions as food and bioenergy production shift away from participating areas. The research concludes that the total leakage rate decreases as the size of the climate coalition increases, but even the most inclusive fragmented scenarios fail to limit global temperature rise to below 2°C by 2100.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"bc3res-000164#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Total carbon leakage rates are inversely related to the size of the climate coalition; the highest rate occurs in the smallest coalition (FR1) at 28% and the lowest in the largest (FR6) at 6% for the 2020-2050 period.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"bc3res-000164#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Terrestrial carbon leakage (TCL) is the primary driver of total leakage up to 2050, with rates ranging from 21% to 93%, significantly exceeding industrial carbon leakage (ICL) rates of 3% to 14% in the same period.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"bc3res-000164#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In the long term (2020-2100), industrial carbon leakage becomes the dominant form of leakage as emissions from land-use change decline after an initial peak between 2020 and 2030.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"bc3res-000164#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Fragmented climate policies trigger a shift in land use where participating regions increase forest area (by 10% to 25% by 2050) while non-participating regions see increases in land dedicated to crops (4% to 40%) and bioenergy (15% to 40%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"bc3res-000164#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The shift of food and bioenergy production to non-participating regions, combined with the pricing of terrestrial carbon, leads to significant global food price increases, potentially by a factor of 2 to 2.5 by 2050 in scenarios FR5 and FR6, and up to a factor of 7 by 2100 in FR6.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"bc3res-000164#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Fragmented regimes where only developed countries participate result in 2100 temperature increases above 3.4°C; even the most optimistic scenario (FR6) results in a 2.4°C increase, exceeding the 2°C stabilization target.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"bc3res-000164#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["carbon leakage","land-use change","deforestation","afforestation","bioenergy","food price"],"geography_discussed":["European Union","People's Republic of China","United States","Russia","Middle East","Africa"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["simulation","scenario analysis"]},{"id":"catf-000493","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/catf-000493","title":"Microsoft Word - Endorse Feinstein-Coburn-12.12.13.docx","publisher":{"name":"Clean Air Task Force","organization":"clean-air-task-force"},"document_type":"statement","language":"en","date_published":"2013-12-12","source_url":"https://cdn.catf.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/21093223/20131212-Endorse-Feinstein-Coburn.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"A coalition of organizations expresses support for the Corn Ethanol Mandate Elimination Act of 2013, arguing that the federal mandate to blend up to 15 billion gallons of corn ethanol into gasoline annually is economically damaging and environmentally harmful.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"catf-000493#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The signatory organizations support legislation to remove the federal requirement that mandates the blending of up to 15 billion gallons of corn ethanol into gasoline every year.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"catf-000493#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Corn Ethanol Mandate Elimination Act of 2013 is viewed as a means to address negative impacts of the fuel mandate, which the authors claim damages the economy, increases domestic and international food prices, harms natural resources, and endangers consumers without delivering promised energy independence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"catf-000493#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["biofuel","food price"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy endorsement"]},{"id":"iisd-000560","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-000560","title":"Food Security Policies in Latin America: New trends with uncertain results","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2010-08-31","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/publications/report/food-security-policies-latin-america-new-trends-uncertain-results","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines how Latin American governments responded to the 2007-2008 food crisis through social protection policies, new legislation, and a focus on food security and sovereignty. It finds that responses were largely uniform across countries, often prioritizing short-term price reductions and trade barriers over long-term agricultural investment and regional cooperation. The report argues for a balanced approach combining macroeconomic stability, targeted social programs, and supply-side agricultural stimulus to address persistent high food prices.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000560#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 2007-2008 food crisis led to three primary policy shifts in Latin America: increased protection for vulnerable sectors against high food prices, a conceptual focus on food security and food sovereignty, and the enactment of new laws providing governments with more tools for public intervention.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000560#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Policy responses across the region lacked country-specific tailoring, with most nations adopting similar packages regardless of their agricultural resources, trade status as net exporters or importers, or importing capacity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000560#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While some countries like Brazil and Mexico implemented direct income or food transfers to the poor, overall policy responses tended to increase trade barriers and failed to increase regional trade or cooperation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000560#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report suggests that food prices will likely remain higher than pre-crisis levels and may increase further after the global recession, necessitating a balanced policy framework of macroeconomic caution, compensatory social programs, and supply-side agricultural stimulus.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000560#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite being net food exporters, many Latin American countries lack the detailed social data and institutional capacity required to make compensatory social policies effective.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-000560#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food security","agricultural production","trade policy","social protection","food price"],"geography_discussed":["Brazil","Mexico"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis"]},{"id":"iisd-001049","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-001049","title":"Agriculture: Future Scenarios for Southern Africa – The Livestock Sector in Zambia and Rising Food Prices","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2009","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/ag_scenarios_south_africa_zambia.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report analyzes the Zambian livestock sector, noting that rising prices are driven by fuel costs, imported feed inputs, climate change, and economic pressures. It highlights a divide between a thriving poultry sector and a struggling beef sector plagued by disease and poor infrastructure. The document argues that while liberalization was intended to modernize the sector, it lacked the necessary socioeconomic safety nets and technical support, leaving small-scale farmers vulnerable. It recommends strengthening research, improving irrigation, and expanding government disease control to stabilize prices and enhance food security.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001049#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Livestock prices in Zambia saw significant increases between 2005 and 2007, with village chicken prices rising by 100% and cattle (beef) increasing by 27.3%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001049#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The poultry sector has grown through economies of scale and improved market access via trade arrangements with the Southern African Development Community and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa, aided by a 1994 import ban on Zimbabwean poultry due to Newcastle disease.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001049#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Zambia remains a net importer of beef due to persistent outbreaks of diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and contagious bovine pleural pneumonia (CBPP), as well as poor funding for data collection and inadequate infrastructure to meet export sanitary standards.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001049#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 1992 liberalization of the agricultural sector, advised by the IMF and World Bank, created a schism where small-scale farmers remain resource-poor and food insecure because the transition lacked socioeconomic safety nets and failed to address constraints like high veterinary drug costs and poor animal husbandry.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001049#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Rising food prices are exacerbated by the high cost of imported fuel and manufactured agro-inputs, such as soya cake for poultry, and by extreme weather patterns like floods that increase the risk of disease transmission from wild buffalo to cattle.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001049#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Zambia's agricultural potential is hindered by the under-utilization of land and water; only 10.5 million of 42 million hectares of suitable land are used, and only 50,000 hectares of a 423,000-hectare irrigation potential are currently irrigated.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001049#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Fertilizer Support Programme (FSP) is described as flawed, with estimates suggesting only 20% of intended small-scale farmers actually receive fertilizer, while other portions are re-exported or resold due to poor documentation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-001049#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food security","climate change","agricultural irrigation","food price"],"geography_discussed":["Zimbabwe","European Union"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","economic analysis","sectoral study"]},{"id":"iisd-002494","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/iisd-002494","title":"Food Production in Mozambique and Rising Global Food Prices","publisher":{"name":"International Institute for Sustainable Development","organization":"international-institute-for-sustainable-development"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2009","source_url":"https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/ag_scenarios_south_africa_mozambique.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines how Mozambique's reliance on food imports and historical underinvestment in agriculture have made it vulnerable to global price spikes, particularly for rice and wheat. It details the transition from state-supported agriculture to neoliberal structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s, which led to a decline in the use of fertilizers and pesticides. To counter current food insecurity, the government has introduced the 'Green Revolution' strategy and the 2008–11 Food Production Action Plan (FPAP), increasing the agricultural budget to 10% of the state budget and reducing import tariffs on staples from 25% to 2.5%. The author argues that long-term success depends on improving infrastructure, resolving land tenure conflicts, and attracting private sector investment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002494#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Mozambique is highly vulnerable to global food price increases, particularly for rice and wheat, due to limited domestic production of these commodities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002494#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Domestic maize production serves as a critical stabilizer for food prices, meaning the country was less affected by global maize price hikes than by those for rice and wheat.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002494#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) starting in 1987 led to a significant decline in agricultural productivity by removing state support and subsidies for inputs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002494#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The government has implemented the 'Green Revolution' strategy and the 2008–11 Food Production Action Plan (FPAP) to reduce the grain deficit and improve food security.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002494#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Short-term policy responses to the food crisis included a 90% reduction in import tariffs for maize, wheat, and rice in early 2008.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002494#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The government is investing approximately US$10 million in the first phase of constructing strategic silos in the food-surplus provinces of Niassa, Nampula, Zambezia, Sofala, and Manica.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002494#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite the Land Law of 1997, significant barriers to private investment remain, including a lack of transparency in lease granting, corruption, and the inability to use land as collateral for loans.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"iisd-002494#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food security","agricultural production","food price","land tenure","trade policy","agricultural irrigation","biofuel"],"geography_discussed":["South Africa","Argentina","Vietnam","Niassa Province","Nampula Province","Zambezia Province","Sofala","Manica Province","Gaza Province","Tete Province","Cabo Delegado"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","economic assessment"]},{"id":"cdkn-000762","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/cdkn-000762","title":"social-lottery_ethiopia-game_ishmael-grain-trader-125fddddaf03a2d0.pdf","publisher":{"name":"Climate and Development Knowledge Network","organization":"climate-and-development-knowledge-network"},"document_type":"guide","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdkn.org/sites/default/files/files/Social-Lottery_Ethiopia-game_Ishmael-grain-trader.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags"],"summary":{"text":"The document outlines a character profile for 'Ishmael', a 35-year-old university-educated grain trader in Kul-Bayne. As a persona for a simulation, Ishmael is described as IT-savvy and financially stable, though he notes that drought has led to increasing prices for food and bottled water. The persona is prompted to consider business opportunities arising from the drought and the possibility of his family joining a volunteer network to support residents during the crisis, while maintaining a social distinction from manual farm labor.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000762#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The character Ishmael identifies that information regarding drought risks is 'very poor', although he utilizes multiple technology sources including TV, radio, mobile, and laptop to stay informed.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000762#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The primary impacts of the drought noted by the character and his wife are the rising costs of food and bottled water.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000762#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["drought","food price","water scarcity"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":[]},{"id":"foei-000478","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/foei-000478","title":"Alimentos, no combustibles: agrocombustibles, precios de los alimentos y hambre","publisher":{"name":"Friends of the Earth International","organization":"friends-of-the-earth-international"},"document_type":"report","language":"es","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Alimentos-no-combustibles.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that agrofuels significantly increase food prices and volatility, contributing to global hunger and poverty. It highlights how biofuel mandates, such as the European Union's 10% renewable transport fuel target, divert land and crops from food production. The report also links large-scale agrofuel production to 'land grabbing' and human rights abuses in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, recommending the elimination of biofuel subsidies in favor of energy efficiency and food sovereignty.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000478#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Agrofuels are identified as a primary driver of increased food prices and volatility, a conclusion supported by international bodies including the World Bank, OECD, and WTO, which state that prices are \"sustancialmente más elevados de lo que serían si no se produjesen biocombustibles\".","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000478#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The production of agrofuels creates additional demand for land and crops, reducing the amount of food available and increasing prices. Specifically, since 2001, agrofuels have accounted for 70% of the increase in maize demand, 13% for wheat, 90% for rapeseed, 47% for soybean oil, and 22% for palm oil.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000478#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Agrofuels strengthen the correlation between food and oil prices because biofuels act as both an agricultural product and an input (via fertilizers and transport), meaning energy price fluctuations are more readily transmitted to food markets.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000478#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"High food prices have had severe humanitarian impacts: the FAO estimated that 100 million more people faced chronic hunger and poverty after the 2008 peak, and the World Bank estimated 44 million people fell into poverty between June and December 2010.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000478#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Large-scale agrofuel production leads to 'land grabbing,' where traditional community lands are sold or leased to foreign investors. In 11 African countries, 5 million hectares—an area equivalent to Denmark—have been acquired for agrofuels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000478#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report refutes industry claims that non-edible crops like jatropha or camelina do not compete with food, stating that these crops still compete for resources, land, and water, often displacing food production on lands essential for local subsistence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000478#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["biofuel","food price","food security","land grabbing","climate change","energy transition","renewable energy","energy efficiency"],"geography_discussed":["European Union","Asia","Russia","Ukraine","United States","People's Republic of China","Africa","Indonesia","Latin America","Argentina","Mozambique"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy assessment","socio-economic impact analysis"]},{"id":"foei-000596","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/foei-000596","title":"Food not fuel: agrofuels, food prices and hunger","publisher":{"name":"Friends of the Earth International","organization":"friends-of-the-earth-international"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Food-not-Fuel.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines the link between agrofuels and rising food prices, asserting that biofuel production diverts crops from food use and increases market volatility. It highlights the resulting impact on the world's poorest populations, including increased chronic hunger and 'land grabbing' in Africa and Asia. The briefing refutes industry claims that agrofuels are benign, noting that they compete for land and water regardless of whether the crops are edible. It concludes by recommending the scrapping of agrofuel mandates, such as the EU's 10 per cent renewable transport fuel target, and the protection of community land rights to ensure food sovereignty.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000596#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Agrofuels are a major driver of food price increases and volatility, as they create additional demand for land and crops that are diverted from food production.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000596#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The impact of agrofuels on food prices is significant enough that international bodies like the World Bank, OECD, and WTO suggest governments should remove policies that subsidize or mandate their production.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000596#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"High food prices, influenced by agrofuels and other factors, have pushed millions into poverty; for example, the FAO estimated 100 million more people entered chronic hunger and poverty after the 2008 spike, and the World Bank estimated 44 million were pushed into poverty between June and December 2010.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000596#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Agrofuels contribute to 'land grabbing', where traditional community lands are acquired by outside investors; Friends of the Earth documented 5 million hectares acquired across 11 African countries, while other studies estimate 37 million hectares worldwide.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000596#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Industry claims that non-edible crops like jatropha and camelina do not compete with food are false, as these crops still compete for land and water and are often grown on land previously used for food.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000596#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Agrofuels strengthen the correlation between food and energy markets, making food prices more susceptible to fluctuations in oil prices.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"foei-000596#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food price","food security","land grabbing","climate change"],"geography_discussed":["European Union","Asia","Russia","Ukraine","Canada","United States","People's Republic of China","India","Africa","Indonesia","Latin America","Argentina","Mozambique"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","impact assessment"]},{"id":"prio-001398","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001398","title":"Food price increase and urban unrest: The role of societal organizations","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/8c2dd163-a27c-44d0-8714-e4aab4dae811/Food price increase and urban unrest The role of societal organizations.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study argues that while rising food prices create economic grievances, these only translate into urban unrest if societal organizations—such as civil society organizations (CSOs) and political parties—are present to provide mobilization structures and frame grievances. Using data from 41 African countries, the author finds that state repression of these organizations generally decreases the probability of unrest. Interestingly, the highest risk of unrest occurs in moderately repressive regimes that still allow some organizational activity, rather than in completely open societies, where citizens may prefer voting over protesting or where organizations provide alternative coping mechanisms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"There is a positive correlation between increasing domestic food prices and the risk of urban unrest in Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"State repression of societal organizations, including CSOs and political parties, generally reduces the likelihood of urban unrest during food price spikes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The highest increase in the probability of urban unrest when food prices rise occurs in countries with moderate repression and barriers to organization, rather than in the most open societies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Severe repression of CSOs specifically reduces the predicted probability of urban unrest by 3.4 percentage points during food price increases.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Societal organizations facilitate unrest by providing mobilization infrastructure and by 'politicizing' individual hardships through the creation of grievance frames.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The study suggests an inverted-U relationship between regime type and conflict, where the highest risk of violence exists in states with insufficient repressive capacity to stop unrest but insufficient openness to provide conventional political channels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food price"],"geography_discussed":["Tunisia","Morocco","Ethiopia","Mauritania","Burkina Faso","Uganda","Egypt","Malawi","The Gambia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["cross-sectional time-series analysis","quantitative research"]}]}