{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"analysis_type":["sub-national analysis"]},"warnings":[{"code":"facet_value_not_in_vocabulary","message":"Value 'sub-national analysis' for facet 'analysis_type' is not in the controlled vocabulary."}]},"total":{"value":5,"relation":"eq"},"page":1,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?analysis_type=sub-national+analysis","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"prio-001647","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001647","title":"What Affects the Distribution of Protests against Coronavirus Measures?","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"policy brief","language":"en","date_published":"2021-05","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/fb283695-b5fd-42fc-8019-c467fc4c04e1/Pfaff Neumayer and Plumper - What Affects the Distribution of Protests against Coronavirus Measures - Conflict Trends 5-2021.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the drivers of protests against pandemic restrictions across Europe, Germany, and the US. It finds that protest intensity is influenced by the perceived asynchronicity between mortality rates and policy stringency, levels of trust in government, and political polarization. In Europe, higher trust and lower civil liberties correlate with fewer protests. In Germany, districts with lower support for mainstream parties saw more protests, particularly in the East. In the US, protest intensity was higher in Democratic-governed states, driven both by stricter measures and political polarization.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"In European countries, the frequency of protests against pandemic policies is negatively correlated with trust in government and public administration, and positively correlated with the level of protection for civil liberties.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Protests are more likely to occur when there is a perceived mismatch, or asynchronicity, between the severity of the pandemic (mortality rates) and the stringency of the containment measures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Germany, protest intensity was higher in districts with lower support for mainstream parties, though this effect was not observed in Eastern German districts where support for mainstream parties is consistently low.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Eastern German districts exhibited a disproportionately high level of protest activity relative to their population size, accounting for 34.6 percent of all German protests despite representing only 19.3 percent of the population.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In the United States, protest intensity was higher in states governed by the Democratic Party compared to those governed by the Republican Party, a result attributed to both the implementation of stricter measures and political polarization.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Economic inequality is identified as a factor that increases protest intensity within the polarized political environment of the United States.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001647#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Norway","Finland","Estonia","France","Spain","Italy","Belgium"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["empirical analysis","cross-country comparison","sub-national analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001789","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001789","title":"The conflict – inequality trap? How internal armed conflict affects horizontal inequality","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2019-12-12","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/d6348de7-ee47-440b-89e9-d794d051622d/The Conflict-Inequality Trap How Internal Armed Conflict Affects Horizontal Inequality.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The paper examines the relationship between internal armed conflict and horizontal inequality, using regional disparities in human development as a proxy. The authors find that high-intensity, long-duration conflicts (over 1,000 battle deaths and lasting more than 5 years) are associated with significantly higher levels of horizontal inequality in infant mortality, wealth, and education. This inequality persists for many years, with declines only appearing 10-15 years after conflict termination. Sub-national analysis suggests that regions directly exposed to fighting suffer more, further widening the gap. Preliminary findings indicate that neither peace agreements nor UN peacekeeping operations significantly mitigate these increases in horizontal inequality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"High-intensity, long-duration conflicts—defined as those with more than 1,000 battle deaths lasting over five years—are associated with substantially higher levels of horizontal inequality in the post-conflict phase.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Low-intensity and short-lived conflicts (lasting 1-5 years) do not show a systematic link to increased levels of horizontal inequality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The increase in horizontal inequality following high-intensity conflict is observed across multiple human development indicators, including infant mortality, wealth, and education, though not significantly for access to electricity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Increases in horizontal inequality are enduring; declines in infant mortality inequality are only statistically significant in the late post-conflict stage, 10-15 years after the conflict ends.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Sub-national analysis indicates that regions directly exposed to armed conflict experience higher infant mortality rates than regions not affected, suggesting that localized destruction and disruption drive horizontal inequality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Preliminary evidence suggests that peace agreements, including comprehensive peace accords, do not effectively alleviate horizontal inequality in the late post-conflict phase.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The presence of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), regardless of mandate size or budget, does not show a discernible mediating effect on reducing post-conflict horizontal inequality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001789#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Colombia","Sri Lanka","South Sudan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["cross-national study","panel data analysis","sub-national analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001349","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001349","title":"Educating Demonstrators: Education and Mass Protest in Africa","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2017-02-20","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/4cc90966-4394-4e29-859e-36aeb1d0bb9d/Education_SISTEVERSJON.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study finds a positive correlation between education and protest activity across 42 African countries, suggesting that education increases both the motivation to challenge authoritarian regimes and the organizational capacity to stage protests.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001349#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Higher local education levels are positively associated with an increased frequency of mass protest events. Simulation suggests that increasing average education from no education to completed secondary education raises the probability of protest in a given year from approximately 2% to 8%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001349#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The positive relationship between education and protest is particularly strong in autocratic regimes, supporting the theory that education enhances ideological preferences for democracy and accountable governance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001349#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Education increases the capacity for collective action by improving communication skills, fostering cooperation, stimulating social networks (specifically 'weak ties'), and creating inter-group solidarity through shared frameworks of reference.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001349#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The study found no evidence that the 'unmet-expectations' or 'J-curve' theory—where education combined with high unemployment spurs protest—is a primary driver in this context.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001349#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Using the historical location of colonial-era Christian missions as an instrumental variable to address endogeneity, the researchers confirmed a causal effect of education on increasing protest incidence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001349#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of non-government protests indicates that education increases the likelihood of protests even when they are not aimed at the state, suggesting that education enhances general organizational opportunities rather than just anti-government grievances.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001349#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Kenya","Zimbabwe","Senegal","Nigeria","South Africa","Lagos","Mali"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["causal inference","sub-national analysis","instrumental variable regression"]},{"id":"prio-001435","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001435","title":"Sins of Omission and Commission","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/cfee6b9e-103d-458a-bbdd-63ec54249ed8/Hanne Fjelde PhD.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that government behavior, rather than just structural factors, determines the risk of civil conflict. It distinguishes between 'sins of omission'—the failure to provide political goods and protect property rights—and 'sins of commission'—the use of patronage politics to co-opt opponents. The author finds that while patronage and corruption generally increase conflict risk, they can actually enhance regime resilience in oil-rich states by bribing potential rebels. Additionally, the research highlights that single-party authoritarian regimes are more resilient to armed conflict than military or multi-party autocracies. In Nigeria, the study finds that non-state conflict is driven by political and economic competition for state patronage rather than ethnic or religious animosity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Single-party authoritarian regimes are more resilient to armed conflict than multi-party or military autocracies because their institutional setup allows for more efficient coercive strategies and the co-optation of opponents.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The risk of civil conflict in multi-party electoral autocracies decreases over time following a regime transition, whereas for military regimes, the risk is initially lower but increases over time.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"High levels of government spending on political goods and the presence of trustworthy institutions are stronger predictors of civil peace than the state's extractive capacity to project force and collect revenue.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In oil-rich countries, political corruption can act as a tool for co-optation, where governments use oil wealth to buy off rivals and reward followers, thereby reducing the risk of conflict compared to what would be expected from corruption and oil dependence alone.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-state armed conflict in Nigeria between 1991 and 2005 was driven by political and economic factors related to the state's administrative organization and the distribution of oil wealth, rather than religious or ethnic animosity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Nigeria, areas characterized by oil production and high income levels are more likely to experience more intense non-state conflicts with higher numbers of battle deaths.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Government failure can be categorized into 'sins of omission,' such as failing to protect property rights, and 'sins of commission,' such as the illegitimate use of public office for personal gain through patronage politics.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["governance"],"geography_discussed":["Nigeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","cross-country statistical analysis","sub-national analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001750","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001750","title":"Socioeconomic Inequality and Communal Conflict: A Disaggregated Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2008","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/71e91de2-66a9-4276-b3b8-b143b2abe9a6/Socioeconomic Inequality and Communal Conflict A Disaggregated Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2008.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study finds that regions in Sub-Saharan Africa with high levels of both vertical and horizontal socioeconomic inequality are significantly more prone to violent communal conflicts. Specifically, the marginalization of the largest ethnic group in a region is a key driver of violence. The authors argue that the exclusionary nature of the African state and elite incentives to mobilize communal identities transform economic grievances into violent clashes over resources and political power.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001750#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Regions characterized by strong socioeconomic inequalities, including both vertical inequality (between individuals) and horizontal inequality (between ethnic groups), face a significantly higher risk of violent communal conflicts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001750#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The risk of communal conflict is particularly high in regions where the largest ethnic group is economically disadvantaged compared to other groups.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001750#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Vertical inequality in household assets and educational attainment both positively correlate with the risk of communal conflict; for assets, a move from the 10th to 90th percentile of inequality increases the predicted annual risk of violence from 0.6% to 2%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001750#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Horizontal inequality specifically increases conflict risk when the largest group is marginalized, whereas the relative privilege of the largest group does not significantly increase the risk of communal conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001750#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The authors argue that the 'exclusionary political legitimacy' of the state in Sub-Saharan Africa leads to a zero-sum competition for resources, where political elites are incentivized to exploit communal divisions to maintain power.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001750#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Other significant predictors of communal violence include the presence of politically excluded groups, higher population density, and greater distance from the national capital, which the authors proxy as weaker institutional presence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001750#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change"],"geography_discussed":["Kenya","Nigeria","South Sudan","Ivory Coast","Sudan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative","cross-sectional time series","sub-national analysis"]}]}