{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"analysis_type":["statistical analysis"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":170,"relation":"eq"},"page":9,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?analysis_type=statistical+analysis&page=9","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"greenca-000213","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/greenca-000213","title":"Cape Town’s Green Sectors Companies Assessed","publisher":{"name":"GreenCape","organization":"greencape"},"document_type":"fact sheet","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://greencape.co.za/assets/OVERALL_GREEN_SECTORS.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document presents data on 600 companies in Cape Town's green sectors, highlighting that the majority are micro-enterprises and that the sector contributes R312 billion to the city's total GDP.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greenca-000213#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"A total of 600 companies were assessed within Cape Town's green sectors. The distribution by company size shows a predominance of micro-enterprises, with 416 micro companies, 185 small, 157 medium, and 129 large companies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greenca-000213#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The green sectors in Cape Town employ 1.6 million people, with formal employment ranging from a minimum of 0.4% to a maximum of 1.8%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greenca-000213#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The total GDP attributed to these sectors in Cape Town is R312 billion, with annual revenue ranging from a minimum of R5.7 billion to a maximum of R29.1 billion.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"greenca-000213#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["green economy","energy storage","sustainable transport","sustainable finance"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["statistical analysis","economic assessment"]},{"id":"napglob-000271","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/napglob-000271","title":"Addressing Loss & Damage","publisher":{"name":"NAP Global Network","organization":"nap-global-network"},"document_type":"fact sheet","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://napglobalnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/napgn-en-2023-infographic-loss-damage-national-adaptation-plan-2.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that NAP processes are central to minimizing loss and damage through adaptation and can inform the operationalization of loss and damage funding. It highlights that NAPs contain country-specific data on vulnerabilities, risks, and adaptation limits, while providing statistics on how frequently specific loss and damage concepts—such as slow-onset events, non-economic losses, and human mobility—appear in these plans.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000271#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) are designed to minimize loss and damage via adaptation actions and may include strategies for losses and damages that are unavoidable through adaptation. They offer data on country-specific vulnerabilities, risks, and the limits of adaptation to help inform the operationalization of loss and damage funding arrangements.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000271#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of NAPs reveals varying levels of integration of loss and damage concepts: 40% directly reference the concept of loss and damage, 40% reference slow-onset events, and 29% reference non-economic losses. Additionally, 40% of NAPs refer to human mobility in a permanent sense.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000271#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"NAPs frequently incorporate risk management and early warning tools, with 95% mentioning disaster risk management and/or reduction, and 80% including insurance and/or early warning systems as priority adaptation actions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"napglob-000271#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["loss and damage","national adaptation plan","climate change adaptation","climate finance","disaster risk reduction","early warning system","insurance"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["statistical analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001246","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001246","title":"Blocking Resolution: How External States can Prolong Civil Wars","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/40f98eae-0a76-481d-8420-be2d3841d246/Blocking Resolution How External States can Prolong Civil Wars.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research argues that external states often intervene in civil wars to pursue objectives separate from those of internal combatants, which makes conflicts harder to resolve. Using Cox regressions on data from 1945 to 2004, the author finds that 'independent interventions' significantly increase war duration compared to 'non-independent' interventions. This is attributed to the introduction of additional demands that shrink the bargaining range, the difficulty of updating beliefs in multi-party conflicts, and the lower costs of fighting for external states compared to domestic actors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001246#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"External states that intervene with an independent agenda—objectives separate from the goals of internal combatants—make civil wars substantially longer.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001246#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The general academic finding that external interventions prolong civil war is primarily driven by the specific subset of cases where interveners pursue independent goals, rather than interventions in general.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001246#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Independent interventions prolong conflict by increasing the number of combatants who must approve a settlement, which complicates bargaining by shrinking the 'bargaining range' of acceptable agreements.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001246#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"External states have less incentive to negotiate than internal actors because they face lower human and economic costs, as fighting occurs outside their own territory and they may exploit local resources to offset expenses.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001246#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"External states perceive lower benefits from negotiation because they cannot easily transition into domestic political movements or power-sharing arrangements, which are options available to domestic insurgents.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001246#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Empirical analysis using Cox Proportional Hazards models shows that wars with clearly independent interventions have an almost 80% chance of surviving to 5,000 days, compared to 40% for wars with any intervention and 20% for wars with no intervention.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001246#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Interventions coded as 'non-independent'—where the external state's goals align with an internal actor—have almost no statistically significant effect on the duration of the war.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001246#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Democratic Republic of the Congo","Sierra Leone","Rwanda","Uganda","Angola","Chad","Afghanistan","Lebanon","Western Sahara"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["statistical analysis","theoretical modeling","case study"]},{"id":"prio-001298","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001298","title":"Conflict trends: A global overview, 1946–2025","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/6f3c619f-6267-4d6b-be19-7bb16dfad782/Conflict trends A global overview 1946-2025 - PRIO Paper 2026.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report finds that 2025 was the third most violent year since 1989, with 245,000 battle-related deaths. It highlights a record high of 65 state-based conflicts and a concerning doubling of international conflicts to eight in 2025. While non-state conflicts decreased slightly, one-sided violence surged to 76,500 fatalities, primarily driven by massacres in Sudan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001298#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"In 2025, total battle-related deaths reached approximately 245,000, making it the third most violent year since 1989. This level of violence was primarily driven by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the bombardments of Gaza, and political violence in Sudan, specifically the massacre in El Fasher.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001298#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The number of state-based conflicts reached an all-time high of 65 in 2025 across 35 countries. There is a growing trend of conflict complexity, where individual countries host multiple simultaneous conflicts; for example, Myanmar had five civil conflicts and Israel had two civil and three international conflicts in 2025.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001298#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Interstate conflicts have increased substantially, doubling from four in 2024 to eight in 2025, the highest number recorded since 1946. These are categorized as border conflicts (e.g., India and Pakistan), regional escalatory conflicts in the Middle East, and invasions (Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Israel's invasion of Syria).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001298#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"One-sided violence against civilians saw a dramatic increase from 14,200 fatalities in 2024 to 76,500 in 2025, the highest since the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This surge was largely due to the RSF takeover of El Fasher in Sudan, where approximately 60,000 people were killed in the last week of October 2025.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001298#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-state conflicts decreased slightly from 79 in 2024 to 75 in 2025, with battle-related deaths falling to approximately 14,500. This decline was partly due to reduced lethal violence between drug cartels in Mexico, although other forms of violence like extortion and abductions increased.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001298#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regional analysis shows Africa as the most affected area, with the number of state-based conflicts nearly doubling from 15 in 2013 to 29 in 2025. Other notable regional trends include a record high of 13 conflicts in the Middle East and a surge in violence in Haiti, where battle deaths rose from 200 in 2024 to over 1,200 in 2025.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001298#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Ukraine","Sudan","Palestine","Myanmar","Israel","Afghanistan","Cameroon","Mali","Nigeria","Pakistan","Mexico","Africa","Americas","Brazil","Colombia","Tanzania","Ethiopia","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Syria","India","Thailand","Cambodia","Haiti","Russia","Middle East","Asia","Europe"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["statistical analysis","trend analysis","regional comparison"]},{"id":"prio-001396","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001396","title":"Foliage and fighting: Forest resources and the onset, duration, and location of civil war","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/6d52ac8c-fdf1-4f90-90ad-c440d255164a/Foliage and Fighting Forest Resources and the Onset Duration and Location of Civil War.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study finds no general statistical relationship between forest resources and the onset or duration of civil wars at the national level. While some disaggregated results suggest that proximity to the coast may prolong conflicts in forested zones, the authors conclude that the perceived link between forests and conflict is largely driven by a few specific cases, such as Burma, rather than a global pattern.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001396#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"At the national level, there is no general relationship between forest resources and the onset of conflict; in fact, some data suggests that higher forest cover is associated with a lower risk of conflict onset.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001396#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"National-level analysis does not support the hypothesis that forest resources prolong civil wars; instead, conflicts in countries with forest or closed forest cover tend to be shorter.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001396#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The perceived positive correlation between forest exports and conflict onset is not a general pattern but is primarily driven by the case of Burma.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001396#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In disaggregated analysis of conflict zones, a shorter distance to the coast is associated with longer conflict duration in forested areas, likely because timber is more easily transported by sea.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001396#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Forest resources do not appear to act as a 'second choice' for rebels in the absence of more valuable lootable resources like oil and diamonds.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001396#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of the post-Cold War period suggests that forest cover may increase the opportunities to extract other conflict commodities, but it does not substitute for them.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001396#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The authors argue that previous claims by NGOs and international organizations (such as FAO and USAID) that forest conflict is a worldwide phenomenon are based on hasty generalizations from a few case studies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001396#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["deforestation"],"geography_discussed":["Myanmar","Cambodia","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Liberia","Ethiopia","Papua New Guinea","Senegal","Bangladesh"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["statistical analysis","comparative study","disaggregated analysis","survival analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001419","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001419","title":"Give Me Liberty, or Give Me Death! State Repression, Ethnic Grievance and Civil War, 1981-2004","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/b7ea1885-a430-44f3-a0a1-79f1392be1c4/Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death State Repression Ethnic Grievance and Civil War 1981-2004.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research analyzes the relationship between state repression of 'empowerment rights' (social, political, and economic liberties) and ethnic fractionalization in predicting civil war onset. Using data from 143 states, the study finds that state repression does not have a direct effect on war onset. However, it discovers a significant conditional effect: in ethnically fractionalized societies, higher levels of state repression actually reduce the probability of civil war, whereas in homogeneous societies, repression increases the risk. These findings challenge 'grievance-based' theories of ethnic conflict, suggesting instead that the opportunity to mobilize—which is constrained by repression—is the primary driver of rebellion in diverse societies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001419#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"State repression of empowerment rights has no direct, statistically significant effect on the onset of civil wars when measured at thresholds of 25 deaths per year or above 1,000 deaths.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001419#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Ethnic fractionalization is a statistically significant positive predictor of civil war onset, with a substantive impact comparable to that of per capita income.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001419#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The effect of state repression on civil war onset is conditional on ethnic fractionalization: repression reduces the risk of war in fractionalized societies but increases it in homogeneous ones.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001419#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In ethnically diverse societies, the risk of a large-scale civil war (over 1,000 deaths) is significantly higher when state repression of empowerment rights is low compared to when it is high.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001419#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The study's results generally contradict the 'deprived actor' or grievance-based view that a lack of ethnic group rights drives civil war, supporting instead the 'rational actor' view that mobilization opportunities are the key driver.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001419#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Other significant predictors of civil war onset include being an oil exporter, having a larger population, and being a noncontiguous state.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001419#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Republic of the Congo","Malaysia","Sri Lanka","Iraq","Afghanistan"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["statistical analysis","comparative political study","longitudinal study"]},{"id":"prio-001465","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001465","title":"How Historians May Explain the ‘East Asian Peace’","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/4c95ce8a-6925-49ac-9ba1-a2661ed2d512/How Historians May Explain the East Asian Peace.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the 'East Asian Peace', a significant reduction in battle deaths in East Asia between 1980 and 2005 compared to the 1946–1979 period. The author argues that this peace was not the result of a single event but a series of staggered political transitions across the region. Key drivers identified include a shift in leadership priorities toward export-driven economic growth and a strategic alignment with the United States. The paper contrasts this with the 'European Peace', noting that the East Asian case does not fit the liberal peace model due to a lack of widespread democratization and political integration.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001465#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"East Asia experienced a sharp decline in warfare after 1979; while there were an average of 10 armed conflicts per year from 1946–79, this dropped to 8 in 1980–2005. More significantly, 'wars' (conflicts with over 1,000 battle deaths annually) averaged 4 per year in 1946–79 but only 0.5 per year from 1980–2005.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001465#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The total number of battle deaths in East Asia plummeted from an estimated 4.2 million between 1950–79 to just over 100,000 between 1980 and 2005.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001465#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'East Asian Peace' does not align with 'liberal peace theory' because the region lacks general political integration and a consistent transition to democratic systems, consisting instead of a mix of authoritarian, semi-democratic, and electoral democracies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001465#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The transition to peace occurred in staggered stages across different nations: Japan in 1946, Korea in 1953/1991/2000, Insular Southeast Asia in 1967, China in 1979, Indochina in 1989–91, and Indonesia internally in 1999/2005.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001465#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A primary driver of the regional peace was the shift by national leaders to prioritize export-driven economic growth over nationalist or ideological territorial goals, leading them to view disputes as a 'nuisance'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001465#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Another central factor was the strategic alignment of regional governments with the United States through formal alliances, de facto alliances, or rapprochement for diplomatic recognition.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001465#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Japan","China","North Korea","South Korea","Vietnam","Indonesia","Cambodia","Philippines","Myanmar","Europe","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["historical analysis","statistical analysis","comparative study"]},{"id":"prio-001651","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001651","title":"Population Pressure, Horizontal Inequality and Political Violence: A Disaggregated Study of Indonesian Provinces, 1990–2003","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/334bf2dd-dfed-4fe3-8828-daf2cea883dc/Population Pressure Horizontal Inequality and Political Violence.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study examines whether resource scarcity and inter-group inequalities drive political violence at a sub-national level in Indonesia. While population growth and horizontal inequality show little effect in isolation, their interaction significantly increases the risk of 'routine' violence. The authors find that in provinces with high population growth, greater inequality between religious groups elevates the risk of violence, suggesting that demographic pressure may amplify existing social segmentations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001651#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Population growth alone has a statistically significant positive effect on the risk of 'routine' violence, but it does not significantly affect 'episodic' violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001651#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Land scarcity does not increase the risk of political violence in Indonesia; in some models, it is actually associated with a lower risk of episodic violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001651#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Religious polarization and horizontal inequality (measured by infant mortality rates between religious groups) do not significantly increase the risk of political violence when analyzed in isolation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001651#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a strong and significant interaction effect between population growth and horizontal inequality: in provinces with high population growth, higher levels of inter-religious inequality significantly increase the risk of routine violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001651#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The interaction between population growth and horizontal inequality also shows some support for increasing episodic violence, though the effect is weaker and influenced by the time period analyzed.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001651#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Urbanization is positively associated with the risk of routine violence, which the authors note is a predominantly urban phenomenon.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001651#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Previous experience with conflict is a very strong predictor of future violence within the same province, though violence does not appear to spread across provincial borders.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001651#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Poorer regions (lower GDP per capita) are more likely to experience routine violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001651#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["urbanization"],"geography_discussed":["Java","Aceh","Papua","Timor-Leste","Maluku","Sulawesi","Kalimantan","Jakarta"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["statistical analysis","disaggregated study","logistic regression"]},{"id":"prio-001736","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001736","title":"Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/db48f7bf-a145-4c6d-9285-0563c235198e/Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers Understanding Variation.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study introduces the SEAP dataset, covering missions by the UN, NATO, ECOWAS, and the African Union from 1999 to 2010. Through multivariate logit regression, the authors identify that larger mission sizes and a history of extensive sexual violence in the host country's preceding conflict are the most robust predictors of reported SEA. Other significant factors include lower economic development in host countries and a general increase in reporting after 2005, likely due to heightened international focus following the 2005 Zeid report.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001736#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The most consistent and robust predictor of reported sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) is the size of the peacekeeping mission; larger operations with more uniformed troops on the ground are more likely to have reported SEA.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001736#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Missions in host countries that experienced high levels of sexual violence during the preceding armed conflict show a significantly higher probability of reported SEA by peacekeepers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001736#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Economic under-development in the host country is associated with a higher likelihood of SEA reports, potentially because local populations have fewer economic alternatives for survival, increasing the market for transactional sex.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001736#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Reports of SEA became more frequent after 2005, which the authors attribute to an increased international focus and awareness following the publication of the Zeid report.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001736#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Higher levels of ongoing violent conflict (measured by annual battle deaths) are associated with fewer reports of SEA, likely because security risks limit troop mobility and interaction with local populations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001736#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Contrary to the authors' initial hypothesis, the presence of laws prohibiting spousal rape in the host country was associated with a slightly higher probability of reported SEA, possibly because such countries are more attuned to uncovering and reporting abuse.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001736#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The inclusion of women in a mission's mandate showed a weak and inconsistent relationship with SEA reports, though some preliminary data suggested missions mentioning women might actually have a higher probability of reports.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001736#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Cambodia","Somalia","Kosovo","Sierra Leone","Liberia","Ivory Coast","Haiti","Sudan","Guinea","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Burundi","Bosnia and Herzegovina"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["statistical analysis","comparative study","multivariate logit regression"]},{"id":"wri-000713","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/wri-000713","title":"Forest Cover, 1990-2005, Indonesia","publisher":{"name":"World Resources Institute","organization":"world-resources-institute"},"document_type":"fact sheet","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://www.wri.org/data/forest-cover-1990-2005-indonesia","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Indonesia's forests, which cover 90 million hectares and represent 10 percent of the world's remaining tropical forests, have faced significant loss since 1990. Approximately 28 million hectares, or 25 percent of the country's forests, have been cleared, with an annual loss of about 1.9 million hectares.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-000713#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Indonesia's forests cover 90 million hectares, representing 10 percent of the world's remaining tropical forests, and serve as a biodiversity hotspot and a source of ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration, freshwater, and medicine.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-000713#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Between 1990 and 2005, Indonesia lost approximately 28 million hectares of forest, which is about 25 percent of its total forest cover.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-000713#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, Indonesia has the second highest annual forest loss globally, losing roughly 1.9 million hectares per year.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"wri-000713#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["deforestation","carbon sequestration","biodiversity"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["statistical analysis"]}]}