{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"analysis_type":["quantitative research"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":10,"relation":"eq"},"page":1,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?analysis_type=quantitative+research","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"afripo-000093","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/afripo-000093","title":"Climate Smart Agriculture Technologies and Youth Employment in Ghana","publisher":{"name":"Africa Policy Research Institute","organization":"africa-policy-research-institute"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2026-03-05","source_url":"https://afripoli.org/climate-smart-agriculture-technologies-and-youth-employment-in-ghana","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the nexus between youth employment and Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) technology in Ghana. It finds a significant disconnect between national policy frameworks and the operational realities of youth-led startups, which face severe constraints in financing, regulatory compliance, and market adoption. While Indigenous knowledge is heavily integrated into product design, it lacks formal policy support and documentation. The study recommends streamlining business registration, operationalizing the National Green Jobs Strategy, and creating targeted financial and gender-inclusive support systems to scale CSA tech as a viable employment pathway for Ghanaian youth.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000093#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"There is a profound disconnect between Ghana's policy frameworks and the experiences of CSA tech startups, with many entrepreneurs reporting low awareness of relevant policies and a lack of participation in policymaking processes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000093#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The National Green Jobs Strategy is identified as the most comprehensive framework for linking CSA tech to youth employment, but it is ineffective due to low awareness among startups, accelerators, and key government ministries, and its tax benefits remain unoperationalised.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000093#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Access to capital is the primary constraint for growth; startups rely heavily on uncertain private grants and avoid debt financing due to high interest rates and collateral requirements, while state support is marginal.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000093#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regulatory hurdles, specifically burdensome business registration and costly, complex intellectual property protection, hinder the formalization and scaling of youth-led CSA ventures.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000093#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Market adoption is unstable because smallholder farmers often show interest in pilots but lack the willingness or capacity to pay for technologies, which are often more expensive than conventional alternatives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000093#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Indigenous Knowledge (IK) is deeply embedded in CSA tech products—with an average of 69% local content in the sampled startups—yet it is largely undocumented and excluded from the National Green Jobs Strategy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000093#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Women's participation in CSA tech entrepreneurship is severely limited, particularly in leadership; the study's sample of ten startups contained no female-led companies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000093#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Startups suffer from high employee attrition, where trained youth staff frequently leave within a year for better-paying roles, creating a cycle of lost investment in training.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"afripo-000093#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["Climate-smart agriculture","traditional knowledge","climate finance","tax incentive","gender equality"],"geography_discussed":["Greater Accra Region","Ashanti Region","Eastern","Central","Northern Regions"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","stakeholder assessment","qualitative research","quantitative research"]},{"id":"sei-000799","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/sei-000799","title":"Climate-friendly lunch purchases","publisher":{"name":"Stockholm Environment Institute","organization":"stockholm-environment-institute"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2024-12-19","source_url":"https://www.sei.org/publications/climate-friendly-lunch-purchases/","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research used an in-store experiment at Urban Deli in Stockholm to test the impact of carbon footprint labels on consumer behavior, utilizing the COM-B model. While the labels improved consumers' capability and opportunity to choose climate-friendly options, they did not successfully trigger the motivation required to change food choices. The authors suggest that labels may need to be paired with other interventions to effectively drive behavioral change, although they remain useful for increasing environmental knowledge.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000799#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Carbon footprint labels increased the capability and opportunity for consumers to make climate-friendly food choices, but they did not trigger the necessary motivation to actually select those options.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000799#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"To effectively increase consumer motivation for sustainable choices, labels may need to be implemented in conjunction with other types of interventions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000799#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite failing to change immediate behavior, labels serve as a tool for increasing knowledge regarding the environmental impact of food and can support future behavioral change initiatives.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"sei-000799#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["experiment","qualitative research","quantitative research"]},{"id":"fsdafri-000134","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/fsdafri-000134","title":"Rebuilding livelihoods in displacement","publisher":{"name":"FSD Africa","organization":"fsd-africa"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2022-03","source_url":"https://fsdafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/ENDLINE-REPORT-Rebuilding-livelihoods-in-displacement-eversion-28022022_compressed.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report finds that while identification and mobile money access for refugees in Uganda improved significantly due to policy changes, formal financial service adoption remains hindered by high transaction costs and long travel distances to agents. Refugees rely heavily on non-employment income and informal savings groups (ASCAs and ROSCAs), with a notable increase in cash kept at home for health emergencies. The COVID-19 pandemic disproportionately reduced refugee incomes and increased expenditures, particularly for food and medicine. The report recommends expanding branchless banking, improving digital and financial literacy, and introducing microinsurance and sustainable energy solutions to enhance refugee financial health.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000134#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Refugee identification improved from 94% at baseline to 99% at endline, though the type of ID significantly impacts financial access; 47% of those with a National ID could access financial services compared to only 17% with a Family Attestation letter.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000134#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Mobile money usage among refugees saw a dramatic increase from 29% to 61% between the baseline and endline, driven by a 2020 policy change allowing refugees to own SIM cards in their own names.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000134#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-employment income, including cash and voucher assistance from the World Food Programme (WFP), remains the primary income source for 87% of refugees, though recipients reported significant reductions in aid, such as a 60% cut in cash-based transfers in Nakivale.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000134#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Gender disparities exist in livelihoods; men are more likely to have regular employment and contractual work, while women-owned businesses tend to be smaller, concentrated in low-margin sectors like vegetable stalls, and less likely to grow.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000134#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There was a sharp increase in refugees keeping cash at home, rising from 29% at baseline to 59% at endline, primarily to ensure immediate access to funds for health emergencies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000134#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Formal financial services are underutilized due to high transaction costs—sometimes reaching 15,000 UGX to access funds—and the need to travel long distances, with some refugees walking two hours each way to reach an agent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000134#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The COVID-19 pandemic caused a more severe income decrease for refugees than for host communities, with 72% of respondents in Nakivale reporting a significant decrease in income.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000134#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Refugees face high expenditures on charcoal for heating and cooking, spending an average of 35,000 UGX per month, which the report identifies as an opportunity for PAYGo solar and clean energy solutions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000134#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Financial health varies by region, with Bidi Bidi (69.7%) and Palorinya (56.7%) showing higher levels than Nakivale (15.6%) and Kampala (15.4%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000134#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Medical costs have risen significantly, with the median cost for medicine increasing from 5,000 UGX at baseline to 20,000 UGX at endline.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000134#insight-10","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["microfinance"],"geography_discussed":["South Sudan","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Moyo"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["comparative analysis","longitudinal study","qualitative research","quantitative research"]},{"id":"fsdafri-000139","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/fsdafri-000139","title":"Financial Inclusion for Refugees (FI4R) Results of Round 3 Diaries","publisher":{"name":"FSD Africa","organization":"fsd-africa"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2021-08-04","source_url":"https://fsdafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/FI4R-Diaries-Round-3-Insights-Digitization-of-saving-groups-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report finds that COVID-19 significantly reduced refugee incomes from employment and self-employment, leaving non-employment income as the primary source of support. While there is openness to digitizing savings groups to improve speed and safety, significant barriers remain, including low smartphone ownership, high transaction costs, and fears that digital tools may undermine group cohesion and meeting attendance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000139#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The COVID-19 pandemic caused a decline in refugee livelihoods, specifically reducing income from regular employment due to school closures and decreasing self-employment revenue because of travel restrictions and reduced customer spending.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000139#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-employment income, consisting of support from governments, NGOs, and aid agencies, remains the primary source of income for refugees, as it provides more consistent support than seasonal or short-term work.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000139#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There has been a general decrease in the use of financial instruments due to reduced cash flow, with the exception of shop credit. Cash remains the preferred mode for most transactions, including savings in ASCAs and ROSCAs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000139#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Refugee households experienced increased vulnerability during the study period, with 53% of respondents reporting hospitalizations and half of the households having children sent home from school due to COVID-19 or lack of fees.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000139#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While refugees value the speed, safety, and privacy of digital financial services, adoption is hindered by low smartphone ownership (27%), high mobile money charges, and poor network availability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000139#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a perceived risk that digitizing savings groups could negatively impact social dynamics, potentially leading to decreased meeting attendance and difficulties in sharing out funds due to transaction fees.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"fsdafri-000139#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["South Sudan","Juba","Adjumani"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["longitudinal study","qualitative research","quantitative research"]},{"id":"cdkn-000537","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/cdkn-000537","title":"Research from India and Kenya - FULL REPORT 1","publisher":{"name":"Climate and Development Knowledge Network","organization":"climate-and-development-knowledge-network"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2017-03","source_url":"https://cdkn.org/sites/default/files/files/Communicating-extreme-weather-event-attribution-FULL-REPORT.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report evaluates how to communicate the link between anthropogenic climate change and extreme weather events, testing various phrasings for probability, frequency, intensity, and uncertainty. Findings indicate that while high-level decision makers often prefer technical percentages and 'probability' terms, the general public finds these confusing, preferring simpler terms like 'worse' or 'more often'. The study highlights significant translation challenges in Swahili and Hindi and recommends that attribution information be downscaled to high spatial resolutions and co-developed with local communication experts and trusted sources, such as national meteorological agencies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000537#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"High-level decision makers and media in Kenya generally prefer percentage-based information and the term 'chance' to communicate probability, while the general public in Kenya finds probability concepts very difficult to understand.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000537#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In India, high-level decision makers prefer the term 'probability' and the use of percentages, whereas the general public showed a preference for the term 'chance'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000537#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regarding frequency, Kenyan high-level decision makers and media prefer the phrase 'twice as often', while the Indian public found statements using 'lifetime' measurements (e.g., twice in a lifetime now occur 4 times) easiest to understand.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000537#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"For intensity, 'severity' is the preferred term for high-level decision makers and media in both Kenya and India, but the Kenyan public prefers the simpler term 'worse'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000537#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Uncertainty information is generally viewed as confusing and unnecessary by the majority of stakeholders, particularly the public in Kenya, who may interpret statistical ranges as a lack of evidence or 'guesswork'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000537#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Simplified statements are consistently preferred over technical ones across all stakeholder groups in both countries, particularly for inconclusive results or events that were less severe than predicted.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000537#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Visual communication is most effective when using location-specific photographs and 'before and after' comparisons; however, technical elements like confidence indicators and generic climate change icons are frequently found confusing or irrelevant.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000537#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"National meteorological agencies are the most trusted sources of climate information for high-level decision makers and media in both India and Kenya.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000537#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Translation into local languages presents significant hurdles, as terms like 'probability', 'likelihood', and 'chance' often translate to the same word in Swahili, and 'frequency' is difficult to translate into Hindi.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"cdkn-000537#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["extreme event attribution","climate change communication","climate variability","climate change adaptation","disaster risk reduction","climate finance"],"geography_discussed":["Bihar","Uttar Pradesh","Kwale County","Turkana County"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["comparative study","stakeholder analysis","qualitative research","quantitative research"]},{"id":"prio-000675","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-000675","title":"DEADLY COMBAT OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: GEMS, PETROLEUM, DRUGS, AND THE SEVERITY OF ARMED CIVIL CONFLICT","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":"2008-10","source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/1c6bfe1e-ae79-4b7f-bce0-6d2cafd8a8b5/Deadly Combat over Natural Resources Gems Petroleum Drugs and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research finds that the location of natural resources relative to the conflict zone is critical to determining conflict severity. Gemstone mining and hydrocarbon production within a conflict zone are strongly associated with higher total combat deaths, with secessionist conflicts in hydrocarbon-rich regions being the most severe. Conversely, drug cultivation in the conflict zone and hydrocarbon production located outside the conflict zone are associated with lower combat deaths and reduced conflict intensity. The study concludes that resources influence severity by altering the incentives and organizational structures of both rebel groups and the state.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000675#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Gemstone mining within a conflict zone is positively associated with a significant increase in the total number of combat-related deaths, more than doubling the toll. This effect is primarily attributed to the longer duration of such conflicts rather than higher intensity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000675#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Hydrocarbon production (oil and gas) inside a conflict zone more than doubles the total number of battle-related deaths and is associated with higher conflict intensity. This is particularly severe in secessionist conflicts, where the number of combat deaths more than doubles and intensity triples compared to conflicts over government.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000675#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Drug cultivation (including coca bush, opium poppy, and cannabis) within a conflict zone is associated with fewer total combat deaths and lower conflict intensity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000675#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Hydrocarbon production located outside the conflict zone, including offshore areas, is related to a decrease in both the total number of combat deaths and the intensity of the conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000675#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The location of resources is the primary driver of their impact; when resource variables are measured as country-level aggregates rather than conflict-level variables, they show no significant effect on conflict severity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000675#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Other significant factors contributing to conflict severity include the relative strength of the combatants, with the deadliest conflicts occurring when rebel and government forces are of equal strength. Additionally, internationalized conflicts, those starting during the Cold War, and conflicts in mountainous terrain tend to be more severe.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-000675#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["crude oil","natural gas","natural resource management"],"geography_discussed":["South Sudan","Myanmar","Ethiopia","Yemen","Sierra Leone","Liberia","Republic of the Congo","Nigeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["empirical analysis","quantitative research","multivariate OLS regression"]},{"id":"issafri-001342","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001342","title":"ECONOMIC REINSERTION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOBILISED MILITARY PERSONNEL","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono61.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines the challenges faced by former South African National Defence Force (SANDF) personnel and combatants from non-statutory forces (such as MK and APLA) as they transition to civilian life. Based on a survey of 307 former soldiers, it finds high unemployment rates, particularly among the youth, and a significant mismatch between the military skills of demobilised personnel and the demands of the South African labour market. The document argues that the demobilisation process was often dysfunctional for individuals, leading to poverty and disillusionment. It recommends a policy shift toward targeted reskilling, public-private partnerships, and the creation of specific Citizen Force units to provide sustainable employment and social reintegration.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001342#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The integration of former statutory and non-statutory forces into the SANDF was functionally effective for the institution, but the subsequent demobilisation and rationalisation processes were often traumatic and dysfunctional for individual members.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001342#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Unemployment is prevalent among demobilised personnel, with 37% of the study's 307 respondents unemployed; this rate rises to 43% for those aged 19 to 30.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001342#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a stark disparity in employment based on education: 65% of full-time employed respondents had attained grade 12 or higher, compared to only 35% of the unemployed group.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001342#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Military training has provided little to no assistance in securing civilian employment; 77% of those who received military training stated it did not help them find a job.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001342#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Former military personnel expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the support provided by the SANDF upon their departure, with 99% of unemployed respondents stating the SANDF had not done enough to help them.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001342#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The South African labour market is experiencing a structural shift where unskilled jobs are disappearing while demand for skilled and semiskilled workers grows; between 1995 and 1999, 567,504 unskilled jobs were lost.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001342#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Service Corps, intended to assist in reskilling, was largely ineffective because its training focused on low-level skills already abundant in the civilian economy, such as bricklaying and motor mechanics.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001342#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Field research revealed deep psychological distress among former soldiers, including reports of suicide, feelings of worthlessness, and a perceived lack of dignity following their rejection by the military.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001342#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report recommends establishing two or three Citizen Force units based on the tradition of the armed struggle to provide part-time employment and preserve the identity of former combatants.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001342#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Gauteng","North West","Eastern Cape","Western Cape","KwaZulu-Natal","Free State","Mpumalanga","Limpopo"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["socio-economic analysis","labour market analysis","qualitative research","quantitative research"]},{"id":"issafri-001975","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/issafri-001975","title":"From Soldiers to Citizens: The Social, Economic and Political Reintegration of Unita Ex-Combatants","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Security Studies","organization":"institute-for-security-studies"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/monograph-130-from-soldiers-to-citizens-the-social-economic-and-political-reintegration-of-unita-ex-combatants-joao-gomes-porto-imogen-parsons-and-chris-alden","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document examines the demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DD&R) process in Angola following the 2002 military victory of the government over UNITA. It highlights the immense humanitarian challenges, including over four million internally displaced persons, and the government's exclusive control over the DD&R process. The authors detail a research project conducted between 2003 and 2005 in the provinces of Huambo, Huíla, and Bié to assess how ex-combatants transition into civilian life within a context of weak state structures and shattered infrastructure.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001975#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 2002 peace process in Angola was fundamentally different from previous attempts because it resulted from a military victory, specifically the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, which accelerated the cease-fire and the completion of military aspects of the Lusaka peace process.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001975#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The scale of humanitarian displacement in Angola by mid-2002 was immense, with over four million people displaced, creating a catastrophic environment that complicated the implementation of DD&R programmes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001975#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Unlike contemporary DD&R programmes in other African nations like Liberia, Burundi, or the DRC, the Angolan government maintained exclusive control and financing of the disarmament and demobilisation process, with no formal third-party monitoring.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001975#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The government declared the extinction of UNITA's Military Forces (FMU) in August 2002, only four months into the process, but this was largely symbolic as thousands of combatants and families continued to arrive at quartering areas months later.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001975#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Socio-economic reintegration has progressed slowly due to institutional incapacity, lack of funds, and the inability of international partners and the government to agree on a timely programme.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001975#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The World Bank's Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (ADRP), approved in March 2003, was estimated at US$230 million by September 2004 to assist over 100,000 ex-UNITA combatants and 33,000 FAA personnel.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"issafri-001975#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Huambo Province","Huíla Province","Bié Province","Liberia","Burundi","Democratic Republic of the Congo"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["case study","quantitative research","qualitative research"]},{"id":"prio-001398","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001398","title":"Food price increase and urban unrest: The role of societal organizations","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/8c2dd163-a27c-44d0-8714-e4aab4dae811/Food price increase and urban unrest The role of societal organizations.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study argues that while rising food prices create economic grievances, these only translate into urban unrest if societal organizations—such as civil society organizations (CSOs) and political parties—are present to provide mobilization structures and frame grievances. Using data from 41 African countries, the author finds that state repression of these organizations generally decreases the probability of unrest. Interestingly, the highest risk of unrest occurs in moderately repressive regimes that still allow some organizational activity, rather than in completely open societies, where citizens may prefer voting over protesting or where organizations provide alternative coping mechanisms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"There is a positive correlation between increasing domestic food prices and the risk of urban unrest in Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"State repression of societal organizations, including CSOs and political parties, generally reduces the likelihood of urban unrest during food price spikes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The highest increase in the probability of urban unrest when food prices rise occurs in countries with moderate repression and barriers to organization, rather than in the most open societies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Severe repression of CSOs specifically reduces the predicted probability of urban unrest by 3.4 percentage points during food price increases.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Societal organizations facilitate unrest by providing mobilization infrastructure and by 'politicizing' individual hardships through the creation of grievance frames.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The study suggests an inverted-U relationship between regime type and conflict, where the highest risk of violence exists in states with insufficient repressive capacity to stop unrest but insufficient openness to provide conventional political channels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001398#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["food price"],"geography_discussed":["Tunisia","Morocco","Ethiopia","Mauritania","Burkina Faso","Uganda","Egypt","Malawi","The Gambia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["cross-sectional time-series analysis","quantitative research"]},{"id":"prio-001655","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001655","title":"Power-sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/6b9ad814-de9f-4f4e-a291-f672fc81e038/Power Sharing Institutions Behavior and Peace.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research examines the causal chain from formal (de jure) power-sharing institutions to peace, arguing that institutions operate primarily by inducing specific behavioral practices (de facto power-sharing). Using a global dataset of 180 countries from 1975 to 2010, the authors find that inclusive institutions increase the share of ethnic groups in government, which reduces the likelihood of rebellions by excluded groups but increases the risk of infighting among coalition partners. Dispersive institutions, such as federalism, are found to decrease the risk of ethnic conflict by increasing regional autonomy for minorities, although this effect is less statistically robust than that of inclusive institutions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001655#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Formal inclusive power-sharing institutions effectively induce the behavior they are designed for by significantly increasing the proportion of ethnic groups represented in central governments.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001655#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Inclusive power-sharing practices create a trade-off: they reduce the probability of conflict between the government and excluded groups, but simultaneously increase the probability of infighting among the ethnic groups within the governing coalition.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001655#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The overall effect of inclusive institutions on general ethnic conflict often appears null or inconclusive because the pacifying effect on excluded groups and the destabilizing effect on coalition partners offset each other.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001655#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Dispersive power-sharing institutions, which decentralize power to subnational levels, decrease the risk of ethnic civil war and territorial conflict by increasing the regional autonomy of ethnic minorities.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001655#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Causal mediation analysis indicates that formal power-sharing institutions have little to no direct effect on conflict; their influence is almost entirely mediated through the behavioral practices they induce.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001655#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"When the causal order is reversed in empirical models, the results show that power-sharing practices have a direct effect on conflict that cannot be explained as being mediated by formal institutions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001655#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Lebanon","Angola","South Africa","Syria","Ethiopia","Guatemala","Indonesia","Nigeria","Belgium","Bosnia and Herzegovina","Fiji"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["causal mediation analysis","quantitative research","comparative political analysis"]}]}