{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"analysis_type":["lobbying analysis"]},"warnings":[{"code":"facet_value_not_in_vocabulary","message":"Value 'lobbying analysis' for facet 'analysis_type' is not in the controlled vocabulary."}]},"total":{"value":7,"relation":"eq"},"page":1,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?analysis_type=lobbying+analysis","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"glowit-000196","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/glowit-000196","title":"Toblerone owner Mondelez courts Trump’s man in Brussels to weaken EU deforestation law","publisher":{"name":"Global Witness","organization":"global-witness"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2026-09-08","source_url":"https://globalwitness.org/documents/1044/2609_-_Global_Witness_-_Mondelez_EUDR_Lobbying_-_Embargoed.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Global Witness reports that Mondelez has shifted from supporting the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) to actively lobbying for its weakening and delay. The company has engaged with US Ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder, joined the American Chamber of Commerce to the EU, and targeted conservative MEPs and government officials in France, Germany, Ireland, and Luxembourg. This lobbying occurs despite Mondelez's lack of transparency regarding its deforestation-free cocoa supply and its links to forest destruction in West Africa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000196#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Mondelez CEO Dick Van de Put met with US Ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder in June 2026 to discuss the EUDR, which Puzder described as a \"non -tariff trade barrier\" that adds \"significant compliance burdens and administrative costs across supply chains.\"","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000196#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The company has implemented a pan-European lobbying strategy, meeting with Brussels powerbrokers every other month since July 2025 and targeting governments in Luxembourg, Ireland, Germany, and France.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000196#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Mondelez joined the American Chamber of Commerce to the EU (AmChamEU) in June 2025, using its board position to meet with top US diplomats, including the US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000196#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In the EU Parliament, Mondelez targeted conservative MEPs from the European People’s Party (EPP), including Norbert Lins and Christine Schneider, in March 2026.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000196#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Mondelez is the only major chocolate company analyzed that does not disclose the percentage of its cocoa supply that is deforestation-free and rejected a shareholder proposal in March 2025 for a full no deforestation policy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000196#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The company's lobbying in Germany included writing to Bundestag members in September 2025 to request an EUDR delay and hiring the firm Fuchs & Cie. to organize discussions with the German Federal Government.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000196#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of cocoa production between 2000-2020 indicates that it caused approximately 2.2 million hectares of deforestation in the Upper Guinean Rainforest and Congo Basin, with Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana as the primary drivers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000196#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["deforestation","carbon dioxide emissions","biodiversity"],"geography_discussed":["United States","France","Germany","Ireland","Luxembourg","Ivory Coast","Ghana","Liberia","Cameroon","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Brussels"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["lobbying analysis","environmental impact assessment"]},{"id":"reclfin-000698","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/reclfin-000698","title":"Have fossil fuel lobbyists captured the European Parliament?","publisher":{"name":"Reclaim Finance","organization":"reclaim-finance"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2026-03","source_url":"https://reclaimfinance.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Reclaim-Finance-Have-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-captured-the-European-Parliament.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Between September 1 and December 18, 2025, 22,158 lobbyist entries were recorded at the European Parliament, with private interests accounting for 59% of visits. The report highlights a pervasive presence of American lobbyists (95% presence rate) and fossil fuel representatives (87.5% presence rate), who utilized direct access and professional consultancies to influence the Omnibus I law. A case study on ExxonMobil reveals the company spent between €1.3 million and €1.7 million on consultancies alone in 2025 to target climate legislation. The analysis concludes that this lobbying effort, supported by a right-wing/far-right parliamentary majority, successfully secured the removal of climate transition plans from the legislation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000698#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Private interests dominated access to the European Parliament between September 1 and December 18, 2025, accounting for 59% of the 22,158 total entries. This group, comprising trade and business associations (23.5%), companies and groups (21.8%), and professional consultancies (13.6%), recorded 13,058 visits, more than double the 6,207 visits made by NGOs.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000698#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The United States was the most active non-European lobbying power, with representatives present 95% of the time during the 80-day study period. American influence is further amplified by professional consultancies; of the 50 most frequent consulting firms, 40 are directly funded by US-based entities, including all of the top 10 firms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000698#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The fossil fuel industry maintained a near-constant presence in the European Parliament, appearing 87.5% of the time (only 10 days without a representative). 27 identified fossil fuel lobby groups—including 10 oil and gas producers, eight associations, and nine service companies—made 468 entries, with 62.3% of visits not linked to a specific appointment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000698#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"ExxonMobil Petroleum employed a multi-layered lobbying strategy in 2025, spending between €1.3 million and €1.7 million on professional consultancies (including Burson Cohn & Wolfe, NOVE, Teneo Brussels, and FTI Consulting) and participating in 25 industry associations. In total, the company's direct and indirect activities resulted in over 650 visits to the European Parliament in less than four months, with total declared costs between €4,000,000 and €4,500,000.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000698#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Lobbying activity peaked during critical negotiations for the Omnibus I law. On November 4, 2025, the European Parliament saw its highest number of fossil fuel lobbyists, with at least 28 representatives from producers, associations, utilities, and consultancies present while amendments regarding climate transition plans were debated.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000698#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report argues that the combined pressure from American representatives, fossil fuel companies, and a right-wing/far-right parliamentary majority successfully led to the removal of climate transition plans from the Omnibus I legislation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000698#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate finance"],"geography_discussed":["United States","Belgium","France","Germany","Italy","Brussels","Strasbourg"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["lobbying analysis","policy impact assessment"]},{"id":"reclfin-000700","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/reclfin-000700","title":"Les lobbies font-ils la loi au Parlement européen ?","publisher":{"name":"Reclaim Finance","organization":"reclaim-finance"},"document_type":"report","language":"fr","date_published":"2026-03","source_url":"https://reclaimfinance.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Reclaim-Finance-Les-lobbies-font-ils-la-loi-au-Parlement-europeen.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"Between September 1 and December 18, 2025, the European Parliament recorded 22,158 lobbyist entries, with private interests accounting for 59% of these visits. The report highlights a disproportionate presence of US-based lobbyists and fossil fuel interests, who were present 87.5% of the time during the studied period. This influence was particularly concentrated around the negotiation of the Omnibus I law, which modified the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD). The analysis reveals that fossil fuel lobbyists often entered the Parliament without declared appointments to engage in informal interactions. A case study of ExxonMobil demonstrates a complex lobbying chain involving direct visits, professional consultancies, and trade associations, totaling over 650 entries in four months to push for the removal of climate transition plans.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000700#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Private interests dominated access to the European Parliament, representing 59% of all entries (13,058 visits) compared to 28% (6,207 visits) for NGOs. This group is primarily composed of professional, commercial, and industrial groups (23.5%), companies and groups (21.8%), and specialized consultancy firms (13.6%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000700#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"US interests maintained a near-constant presence in the European Parliament, with lobbyists from the United States present on 95% of the 80 open days between September 1 and December 18, 2025. Four of the ten most frequent companies were American, though some used strategic domiciles in Belgium or Ireland.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000700#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Consultancy firms act as a critical mechanism for US influence; among the 50 most frequent consultancy firms, 40 are directly funded by US-based actors, including all of the top 10.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000700#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The fossil fuel industry exhibited a massive presence, with representatives present 87.5% of the time (only 10 days without a representative). 27 identified fossil fuel actors—including oil and gas producers, trade associations, and infrastructure specialists—made 468 entries.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000700#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A significant portion of lobbying occurs informally without declared appointments. For example, the trade association FuelsEurope entered the Parliament 61 times over 25 days but had only 21 declared appointments, meaning it was present for 8 days without any official meeting.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000700#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"ExxonMobil utilized a multi-layered strategy combining direct lobbying (40 visits), indirect lobbying via consultancies (250 visits), and trade associations (367 visits), totaling over 650 entries in four months. The company spent between €4M and €4.5M on these activities in 2025 to influence the Omnibus I law.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000700#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Lobbyist activity peaked during critical decision-making windows for the Omnibus I law. On November 4, the Parliament saw its third-highest daily volume of lobbyists, including at least 28 representatives from the fossil fuel sector (producers, associations, and consultancies like NOVE and FTI Consulting) while amendments to remove climate transition plans were being discussed.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000700#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["fossil fuel","climate finance"],"geography_discussed":["United States","Belgium","France","Germany","Italy","Ireland"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["lobbying analysis","policy influence study"]},{"id":"reclfin-000657","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/reclfin-000657","title":"Lobbying - How the private sector hijacked the Omnibus Directive","publisher":{"name":"Reclaim Finance","organization":"reclaim-finance"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2025-10","source_url":"https://reclaimfinance.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Lobbying-note-Reclaim-Finance.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report argues that the European Commission's 'Omnibus I' proposal, unveiled on February 26, 2025, represents a shift toward deregulation driven by disproportionate private sector influence. Analysis of meeting logs shows that Executive Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné and his office met almost exclusively with business interests, while excluding civil society, NGOs, and trade unions. This lobbying resulted in significant setbacks for the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), including the removal of obligations for financial services to undergo due diligence reviews.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000657#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 'Omnibus I' proposal, presented on February 26, 2025, seeks to weaken the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), contradicting previous claims by Stéphane Séjourné that his mandate would not mean deregulation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000657#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Proposed changes to the CSDDD include limiting the 'value chain' scope to direct 'Tier 1' partners, extending the frequency of regular assessments from annually to every five years, and removing the obligation to implement climate transition plans and the harmonised civil liability regime.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000657#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Proposed changes to the CSRD would reduce the number of affected companies by over 80% by restricting the scope to those with more than 1,000 employees and €50 million in revenue, while also removing sector-specific reporting standards.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000657#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of meetings held by Executive Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné reveals a heavy bias toward private interests; 100 of his 103 meetings between December 1, 2024, and October 1, 2025, were with private stakeholders with economic or financial expectations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000657#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The office of the Executive Vice-President also showed a strong preference for business interests, with 165 out of 190 meetings (approximately 87%) conducted with companies or private interest groups, including MEDEF and BusinessEurope.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000657#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Lobbying by financial actors, such as the French Asset Management Association (AFG), specifically targeted the removal of Article 36(1) of the CSDDD, which would have required the Commission to report on the necessity of sustainability due diligence for financial services.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000657#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The report claims the Omnibus I proposal satisfied 70% of the demands made by MEDEF.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000657#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate finance","greenwashing","biodiversity","human rights"],"geography_discussed":["France","Romania","People's Republic of China","Poland"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","lobbying analysis"]},{"id":"reclfin-000551","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/reclfin-000551","title":"Lobbying analysis on Omnibus","publisher":{"name":"Reclaim Finance","organization":"reclaim-finance"},"document_type":"briefing","language":"en","date_published":"2025-03","source_url":"https://reclaimfinance.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Analysis-of-Omnibus-final-proposal_Content-and-link-to-lobbying.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes the EU Omnibus proposal, characterizing it as a \"massive deregulation project\" that weakens corporate sustainability and due diligence requirements. It compares the proposal's specific changes to the demands of industry lobbies—including the French Banking Federation (FBF), Medef, BDI, Confindustria, the American Chamber of Commerce, and Business Europe—concluding that the Commission's proposal closely aligns with these corporate interests, suggesting \"corporate capture.\"","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000551#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The EU Omnibus proposal significantly weakens the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) by removing the obligation for Member States to ensure civil liability for due diligence failures and eliminating representative actions, which limits the ability of victims and NGOs to seek legal remedies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000551#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The proposal narrows the CSDDD value chain scope to direct (Tier 1) suppliers only, which the author argues will result in severe impacts in raw material extraction and further up the supply chain being ignored.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000551#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Climate transition plans under the CSDDD are reduced to a \"checkbox exercise\" because the proposal removes the requirement for these plans to be \"put into effect,\" meaning public authorities can no longer enforce their implementation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000551#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) scope is drastically reduced, cutting the number of required reporting companies by more than 80% by raising the employee threshold from 250 to 1,000.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000551#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The proposal weakens CSRD audit quality by replacing the \"reasonable assurance\" standard with a \"limited assurance\" standard, which the author claims will result in fewer checks on the relevance and quality of sustainability information.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000551#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The EU Sustainable Taxonomy is weakened through the introduction of materiality thresholds that allow companies to avoid assessing taxonomy-eligibility for activities not exceeding 10% of turnover, capex, or assets, and by proposing a 70% reduction in datapoints.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000551#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The author concludes that the EU Commission's proposal is the result of \"corporate capture,\" as there is a \"very high degree of similarity\" between the Omnibus measures and the demands of key corporate and financial lobbyists.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"reclfin-000551#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["decarbonization","greenhouse gas emissions","greenwashing"],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","lobbying analysis"]},{"id":"glowit-000206","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/glowit-000206","title":"BURNING THE PUBLIC","publisher":{"name":"Global Witness","organization":"global-witness"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2022-09","source_url":"https://globalwitness.org/documents/166/Burning_the_Public.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report argues that the gas industry is pushing hydrogen heating to avoid a 'death spiral' as consumers switch to electric heat pumps. It claims that converting gas grids to hydrogen could cost European users €240bn and that 'hydrogen ready' boilers are a greenwashing tactic to lock in fossil gas use. The document highlights that hydrogen combustion emits dangerous nitrogen oxides (NOx), contrary to industry marketing, and that heat pumps are significantly more cost-effective and efficient than hydrogen-based heating.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000206#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Gas suppliers are lobbying the European Commission to allow the costs of expanding and converting gas infrastructure for hydrogen to be paid for by current gas consumers, a process described as 'mutualisation of costs'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000206#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The estimated cost for all gas users to convert and build hydrogen gas infrastructure to carry 100% hydrogen is €240bn over 40 years.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000206#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Boiler manufacturers are marketing 'hydrogen ready' and 'hydrogen blend ready' boilers as climate-friendly, but these products may lock consumers into burning fossil gas for their entire lifetime due to the slow rollout of hydrogen infrastructure.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000206#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Industry marketing often misleadingly claims that burning hydrogen only produces water, omitting the emission of dangerous nitrogen oxides (NOx) which are linked to respiratory problems and reduced cognitive performance in children.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000206#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Hydrogen heating is significantly more expensive and less efficient than electric heat pumps; an average European household could face an annual cost of €1,580 for hydrogen, which is twice the cost of an average fossil gas bill.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000206#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Hydrogen blending (adding small amounts of hydrogen to the gas supply) is an expensive strategy with limited climate benefits, providing a maximum of only 7% emissions reductions for a 20% blend.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000206#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Blue hydrogen, produced from fossil gas with carbon capture, may have higher greenhouse emissions than burning fossil gas when methane leakage is considered, and it risks locking in fossil fuel infrastructure.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"glowit-000206#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["hydrogen","heat pump","natural gas","blue hydrogen","green hydrogen","energy poverty","climate finance","greenwashing"],"geography_discussed":["Germany","United Kingdom","Belgium","Canada"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy analysis","lobbying analysis","economic assessment"]},{"id":"chanmar-000098","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/chanmar-000098","title":"Talking Trash: the corporate playbook of false solutions to the plastic crisis","publisher":{"name":"Changing Markets Foundation","organization":"changing-markets-foundation"},"document_type":"statement","language":"en","date_published":"2020-10-29","source_url":"https://changingmarkets.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CMF-Letter-PresidentVonderLeyen.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Changing Markets Foundation warns that global plastic production is set to double by 2030 and could account for 15% of greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The organization argues that industry lobbying is currently undermining the EU's Single-Use Plastic Directive through attempts to exempt bio-based plastics, viscose, and cellophane from the definition of single-use plastics. It further highlights efforts by brands and producer responsibility organisations to jeopardize deposit return systems (DRS), which the author claims are the only viable way to achieve 90%+ collection of beverage bottles. The letter calls for the EU to move beyond voluntary commitments and implement robust measures against overpackaging, greenwashing, and 'false solutions' like chemical recycling and incineration.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"chanmar-000098#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Global plastic production is projected to double by 2030, and if current rates continue, it will be responsible for 15% of greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"chanmar-000098#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Industry actors are attempting to weaken the Single-Use Plastic Directive by seeking exemptions for bio-based, biodegradable plastics, viscose, and cellophane.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"chanmar-000098#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Brands, retailers, and producer responsibility organisations (PROs) are lobbying against deposit return systems (DRS), despite these systems being identified as the only viable method to reach a 90%+ collection rate for beverage bottles.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"chanmar-000098#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The document identifies incineration, waste-to-energy, plastic-to-fuel, and chemical recycling as 'false solutions' that do not contribute substantively to a circular economy and undermine mechanical recycling and reuse.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"chanmar-000098#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["plastic pollution","single-use plastic","greenhouse gas emissions","circular economy","waste-to-energy","incineration","greenwashing"],"geography_discussed":["United Kingdom","Belgium","World"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["policy advocacy","lobbying analysis"]}]}