{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"analysis_type":["ethnographic monitoring"]},"warnings":[{"code":"facet_value_not_in_vocabulary","message":"Value 'ethnographic monitoring' for facet 'analysis_type' is not in the controlled vocabulary."}]},"total":{"value":4,"relation":"eq"},"page":1,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?analysis_type=ethnographic+monitoring","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"isdglo-000067","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000067","title":"A Year of Hate: Anti-Drag Mobilization Efforts Targeting LGBTQ+ People in the US","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2023","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Anti-drag-Mobilization-Efforts-Targeting-LGBTQ-People-in-the-US.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report documents 203 incidents of anti-drag mobilization in the US, noting an increase in activity in early 2023 compared to late 2022. It identifies a diverse coalition of actors—including the Proud Boys, parents' rights groups, and anti-vaccine activists—who employ tactics such as doxxing, vandalism, and the 'groomer' narrative to intimidate performers and venues. The analysis highlights the real-world consequences of this hate, including the cancellation of events and the financial distress of small businesses.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000067#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Between June 1, 2022, and May 20, 2023, there were 203 incidents targeting drag events in the US. Of these, 100 (49%) targeted drag queen story hours and 75 (37%) targeted drag shows.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000067#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Anti-drag activity increased in frequency during the first five months of 2023, averaging 19.4 incidents per month, compared to an average of 15.1 per month in the final seven months of 2022.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000067#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Proud Boys are the most active group targeting drag events, having targeted 60 events across 20 states, with 39 of those resulting in verbal or physical clashes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000067#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The most prevalent narratives used to slander drag performers and their supporters characterize them as \"pedophiles\" or \"groomers,\" and claim that drag is inherently sexual and inappropriate for children.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000067#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Tactics used to target events include on-site protests (sometimes involving weapons), doxxing of performers and parents, stickering campaigns, and harassment via email or phone to force event cancellations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000067#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The mobilization has led to tangible harms, including the cancellation of 6.4% of targeted drag events for security reasons and severe financial and operational distress for small businesses, such as a bakery in Illinois that was forced to relocate.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000067#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["New York","Texas","California","Illinois","Ohio","Colorado Springs"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["country profile","ethnographic monitoring","trend analysis"]},{"id":"isdglo-000167","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000167","title":"A Year of Hate","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2023","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Understanding-Threats-and-Harassment-Targeting-Drag-Shows-and-the-LGBTQ-Community.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report identifies a global convergence of far-right groups, conspiracy theorists, and 'parents' rights' movements targeting drag events to denigrate the LGBTQ+ community. While the US is the primary driver of narratives and the only country in the set to pass anti-drag legislation, similar tactics like doxxing and harassment are appearing globally. The report highlights the use of 'save the children' and 'groomer' narratives to justify extremism and warns that these fringe tropes are becoming mainstreamed in political discourse.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000167#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Anti-drag activism is driven by loose coalitions consisting of far-right groups, COVID-19 conspiracy theorists, fundamentalist religious activists, and right-wing influencers. While political support for these actions exists in France, Australia, and the US, only in the US are a significant number of mainstream party elected representatives actively engaging in anti-drag rhetoric.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000167#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The United States serves as the global epicenter for anti-drag activity, recording the highest number of protests and violent incidents, including the Club Q shooting and an attempted arson. The US also exports the narratives and tactics used by movements in other countries and is the only reviewed nation where anti-drag legislation has been successfully enacted.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000167#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Anti-LGBTQ+ actors globally employ a shared set of harassment tactics, including doxxing, threats of violence, coordinated harassment of venues, and 'review bombing' of public services. Despite these pressures, the majority of targeted performances are not cancelled; in the US dataset, only 6.4% of targeted performances were cancelled.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000167#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'protecting children' narrative is the primary justification for extreme protests, framing drag performers as 'groomers' or predatory 'ideological indoctrinators'. This framework often overlaps with QAnon-related 'save the children' conspiracy theories to justify extreme actions as necessary to prevent harm to minors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000167#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Several secondary narratives are used to delegitimize LGBTQ+ identities, including framing drag as misogyny (primarily in the UK and Australia), conflating drag performers with transgender individuals, and claiming that LGBTQ+ identities are a 'gender ideology'. In Australia, some activists specifically link LGBTQ+ identities to Satanism, describing performers as 'demons'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000167#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Anti-drag activists frequently target public libraries and councils by claiming that hosting drag events is a waste of public resources. This narrative is used as a vector to pressure local governments to cancel events through template complaints and harassment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000167#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Ireland","Finland","Sweden","Switzerland","Europe","Central Asia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["narrative analysis","ethnographic monitoring"]},{"id":"isdglo-000119","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000119","title":"Monitoring Disinformation and Influence Campaigns in the 2022 French Elections: Lessons Learnt","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2022","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Monitoring-Disinformation-and-Influence-Campaigns-in-the-2022-French-Elections_Lessons-Learnt.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) monitored the 2022 French elections, finding that while Russian state-backed influence was limited due to EU bans, domestic non-state actors and far-right figures effectively leveraged social media to spread anti-establishment narratives. Key tactics included coordinated inauthentic behaviour by Éric Zemmour's campaign, the cross-platform monetisation of fake vaccination passes, and the mainstreaming of the 'Great Replacement' conspiracy theory. The report highlights significant gaps in platform content moderation, particularly regarding online abuse of candidates and voter fraud narratives, and recommends stronger regulatory oversight and data transparency from social media companies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000119#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The campaign of far-right candidate Éric Zemmour employed coordinated inauthentic behaviour to amplify his agenda. ISD identified twelve petitions created by 'Les Amis d’Éric Zemmour' between January 2021 and June 2022, noting that sharing patterns on Twitter indicated inauthentic mobilisation, particularly in the weeks preceding the election.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000119#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Malign actors used cross-platform strategies to disseminate and monetise disinformation, specifically regarding fake vaccination passes. Actors used mainstream platforms like Facebook and Instagram to attract users and then redirected them to encrypted or closed spaces such as Telegram and WhatsApp to complete transactions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000119#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 2022 elections saw a shift from state-led to non-state influence. While the EU-wide ban on Russian state media limited the impact of Russia-backed actors, domestic sovereigntist and far-right figures used their large audiences to fuel distrust in institutions by embracing anti-vaccine sentiment and pro-Russian content following the invasion of Ukraine.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000119#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Far-right Identitarian ideas, specifically the 'Great Replacement' conspiracy theory, were moved into mainstream public discourse. This was driven by Éric Zemmour's candidacy and manifesto, as well as inauthentic online tactics like astroturfing and the coordinated promotion of petitions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000119#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Online abuse and incivility targeting candidates became a normalised political tactic. ISD found that for most candidates, abusive comments represented 15% to 25% of all comments on Facebook, with women and minoritised candidates disproportionately targeted with racist and misogynistic abuse.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000119#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Voter fraud narratives, imported from the US 'Stop the Steal' movement, emerged in France. These claims were amplified by fringe political figures such as Florian Philippot, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, and François Asselineau, though they had limited reach on mainstream social media compared to other political scandals.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000119#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Social media platforms demonstrated inconsistent enforcement of their own terms of service. ISD found that Twitter failed to label voter fraud statements by high-profile public figures as 'misleading', and Meta failed to label similar allegations regarding voting machines.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000119#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["World","United States","Germany","Australia","Ukraine","Russia"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["social media analysis","ethnographic monitoring","policy analysis"]},{"id":"isdglo-000159","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000159","title":"The Propaganda Pipeline: The ISIS Fuouaris Upload Network on Facebook","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2020-07-13","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/The-Propaganda-Pipeline-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report provides a case study of the Fuouaris Upload network, a pro-ISIS ecosystem on Facebook that used account hijacking, content masking, and coordinated 'raids' to spread propaganda. Between April 7 and July 3, 2020, researchers tracked 288 accounts, finding that a core group of 90 was controlled by a single user, Luqmen Ben Tachafin. The network expanded to SoundCloud and utilized multilingual communities (including Indonesian, Somali, and Albanian) to bypass moderation. The report highlights the use of COVID-19 narratives to celebrate death tolls and the exploitation of virtual phone number apps to hijack accounts, arguing that Facebook's reliance on AI and hashing is insufficient without 'street level' understanding of extremist tactics.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Between April 7 and July 3, 2020, ISD tracked 288 pro-ISIS accounts, with a core of 90 accounts controlled by one individual named Luqmen Ben Tachafin. By May 21, this network had shared 50 videos that garnered over 34,000 views.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The network employed 'content masking' to bypass Facebook's automated hashing technology, such as adding non-extremist introductions (e.g., Quranic recitals or mainstream documentary clips) and overlaying symbols to hide official ISIS logos.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"ISIS supporters used virtual phone number applications from the US and Canada to hijack existing Facebook accounts by intercepting password reset text messages.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The network coordinated 'raids' on high-profile Facebook pages, including the US Department of Defence, the US Army, and the US Air Force Academy, flooding comment sections with terrorist imagery and threats.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The network exploited the COVID-19 pandemic by creating pages that celebrated the virus as a 'soldier of God' and highlighted death tolls in countries part of the Global Coalition against Daesh.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Multilingual communities in Indonesian, Somali, Ethiopian, and Albanian languages were found to be less heavily moderated than Arabic accounts, with some sharing explicit bomb-making tutorials.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The network operated across multiple platforms, using Facebook to signpost users to ISIS content on SoundCloud, Telegram, WhatsApp, and standalone websites like 'The Punishment'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite the removal of 70 percent of the Fuouaris Upload accounts during the monitoring period, the network showed resilience through the use of 'placeholder' and 'war spoils' (hijacked) accounts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["United States","Lebanon","Egypt","Syria","Yemen","Canada"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["case study","digital analysis","ethnographic monitoring"]}]}