{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"analysis_type":["digital analysis"]},"warnings":[{"code":"facet_value_not_in_vocabulary","message":"Value 'digital analysis' for facet 'analysis_type' is not in the controlled vocabulary."}]},"total":{"value":2,"relation":"eq"},"page":1,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?analysis_type=digital+analysis","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"isdglo-000112","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000112","title":"Layers of Lies: A First Look at Irish Far-Right Activity on Telegram","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2021","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Layers-of-Lies.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report examines 34 Irish far-right Telegram channels, revealing a massive increase in activity between 2019 and 2020. It details how these communities use the platform's limited moderation to target minorities, LGBTQ+ individuals, and political opponents through orchestrated disinformation campaigns. Case studies show the far-right's role in inciting racial tension following the shooting of George Nkencho, spreading false claims about a house fire in Balbriggan, and launching a homophobic smear campaign against Minister Roderic O'Gorman. The analysis also highlights a significant intersection between far-right actors and COVID-19 conspiracy networks.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000112#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"There was a massive surge in Irish far-right activity on Telegram between 2019 and 2020, with the number of messages increasing by 7,438%. In 2019, a small number of channels posted 801 messages, whereas 34 channels posted 60,377 messages in 2020.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000112#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Far-right Telegram channels in Ireland orchestrate disinformation campaigns to incite racial and social tension. Following the shooting of George Nkencho, channels provided specific instructions to followers to 'make memes, dig up stats, turn on your VPN and get trolling' and to use racial slurs like 'joggers' to provoke Black people on other social media platforms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000112#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Irish far-right uses Telegram to launch targeted harassment and homophobic smear campaigns. A campaign against Minister Roderic O'Gorman used the platform to amplify baseless claims that he was a 'paedophile apologist', which then served as an entry point for wider attacks against the LGBTQ+ community in Ireland.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000112#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Far-right actors use Telegram to spread racist tropes and disinformation about specific locations. In Balbriggan, channels promoted the false claim that a house fire was caused by 'African drug gangs', leveraging a pre-existing narrative that synonymises Blackness with criminality.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000112#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a significant intersection between far-right movements and COVID-19 conspiracy networks in Ireland. Analysis of nine COVID-19 conspiracy channels found that 9% of all messages originated from a far-right source, with some individual far-right activists exerting high influence across the entire network.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000112#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Hostility toward mainstream media and researchers is a core tactic of the Irish far-right. During anti-mask protests and the Nkencho incident, channels used Telegram to label news reports as 'blatant lies' and spread conspiracy theories that researchers from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) were funded by MI5.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000112#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["climate change disinformation"],"geography_discussed":["Dublin","Balbriggan","Galway","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["digital analysis","case study","network analysis"]},{"id":"isdglo-000159","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/isdglo-000159","title":"The Propaganda Pipeline: The ISIS Fuouaris Upload Network on Facebook","publisher":{"name":"Institute for Strategic Dialogue","organization":"institute-for-strategic-dialogue"},"document_type":"report","language":"en","date_published":"2020-07-13","source_url":"https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/The-Propaganda-Pipeline-1.pdf","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The report provides a case study of the Fuouaris Upload network, a pro-ISIS ecosystem on Facebook that used account hijacking, content masking, and coordinated 'raids' to spread propaganda. Between April 7 and July 3, 2020, researchers tracked 288 accounts, finding that a core group of 90 was controlled by a single user, Luqmen Ben Tachafin. The network expanded to SoundCloud and utilized multilingual communities (including Indonesian, Somali, and Albanian) to bypass moderation. The report highlights the use of COVID-19 narratives to celebrate death tolls and the exploitation of virtual phone number apps to hijack accounts, arguing that Facebook's reliance on AI and hashing is insufficient without 'street level' understanding of extremist tactics.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Between April 7 and July 3, 2020, ISD tracked 288 pro-ISIS accounts, with a core of 90 accounts controlled by one individual named Luqmen Ben Tachafin. By May 21, this network had shared 50 videos that garnered over 34,000 views.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The network employed 'content masking' to bypass Facebook's automated hashing technology, such as adding non-extremist introductions (e.g., Quranic recitals or mainstream documentary clips) and overlaying symbols to hide official ISIS logos.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"ISIS supporters used virtual phone number applications from the US and Canada to hijack existing Facebook accounts by intercepting password reset text messages.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The network coordinated 'raids' on high-profile Facebook pages, including the US Department of Defence, the US Army, and the US Air Force Academy, flooding comment sections with terrorist imagery and threats.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The network exploited the COVID-19 pandemic by creating pages that celebrated the virus as a 'soldier of God' and highlighted death tolls in countries part of the Global Coalition against Daesh.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Multilingual communities in Indonesian, Somali, Ethiopian, and Albanian languages were found to be less heavily moderated than Arabic accounts, with some sharing explicit bomb-making tutorials.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The network operated across multiple platforms, using Facebook to signpost users to ISIS content on SoundCloud, Telegram, WhatsApp, and standalone websites like 'The Punishment'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Despite the removal of 70 percent of the Fuouaris Upload accounts during the monitoring period, the network showed resilience through the use of 'placeholder' and 'war spoils' (hijacked) accounts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"isdglo-000159#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["United States","Lebanon","Egypt","Syria","Yemen","Canada"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["case study","digital analysis","ethnographic monitoring"]}]}