{"query_echo":{"q":"","filters":{"analysis_type":["Quantitative Analysis"]},"warnings":[]},"total":{"value":472,"relation":"eq"},"page":22,"page_size":20,"self":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?analysis_type=Quantitative+Analysis&page=22","next":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/api/v1/search?analysis_type=Quantitative+Analysis&page=23","stability":"beta","ai_marking":{"digital_source_type":{"uri":"http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/digitalsourcetype/trainedAlgorithmicMedia","name":"Created using Generative AI"},"notice":"Summary and key insights are generated using artificial intelligence."},"results":[{"id":"prio-001371","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001371","title":"Ethno-Nationalist Triads: Assessing the Influence of Kin Groups on Civil Wars","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/2f014d34-342d-4028-b156-0aa74d757cbd/Ethno-Nationalist Triads Assessing the Influence of Kin Groups on Civil Wars.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research argues that transnational ethnic ties increase the risk of civil war, but this effect is conditional on the domestic demographic size of the marginalized group. Using a triadic model and geocoded data, the authors find that larger excluded groups with kin in neighboring states are significantly more likely to engage in conflict than those without such ties, while the governmental status of the external kin group does not have a statistically significant impact.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001371#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The probability of ethno-nationalist civil war increases when marginalized ethnic groups are larger in relative demographic size, are located further from the state capital, or reside in mountainous terrain.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001371#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Transnational ethnic ties do not unconditionally increase the risk of conflict; rather, their influence is conditional on the domestic power balance of the marginalized group.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001371#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The presence of transnational kin in neighboring states significantly improves the predictive accuracy of conflict onset models compared to models relying solely on domestic variables.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001371#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is no statistically significant evidence that the risk of conflict is higher when the external kin group is in power (governmental) as opposed to being a marginalized group themselves.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001371#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The risk of conflict is specifically heightened for groups with kin in neighboring states (within 500 km), as geographical proximity facilitates resource mobilization and provides tactical advantages like extra-territorial bases.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001371#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The study's findings are consistent across both static analysis (1945-2005) and dynamic annual panel data, confirming that the interactive effect between demographic size and transnational ties is robust.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001371#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Turkey","Iraq","Croatia","Bosnia and Herzegovina","Kosovo","Switzerland"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","dyadic analysis","triadic model","regression analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001373","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001373","title":"Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/ba2631d9-71a0-4297-9b5f-93d7d52b73ac/Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research examines the determinants of external state support for rebel groups using a new dataset of 403 organizations. It argues that support is not merely a function of the civil war's general characteristics but depends on the specific attributes of the rebel group and the international relations of the target state. The findings indicate that moderately strong groups with transnational constituencies are most likely to receive aid, particularly when the target state is involved in an international rivalry or receives its own external support. Conversely, very strong or very weak groups, and those in democratic states, are less likely to be supported.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001373#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"External support is most likely for rebel groups of moderate strength; the strongest and weakest groups are less likely to receive assistance. Very weak groups are seen as unworthy investments, while the strongest can rely on domestic resources and prioritize autonomy.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001373#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Rebel groups with transnational constituencies—including those with ethnic, religious, or ideological ties across borders—are significantly more likely to receive external state support.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001373#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Insurgent groups are more likely to receive external assistance if the state they are fighting is engaged in an international rivalry, as sponsoring rebels is a tactic to undermine enemies without initiating full-scale interstate war.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001373#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Counterbalancing interventions are common, where external states support rebel groups specifically because the target government is already receiving external assistance.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001373#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Contrary to the authors' initial hypothesis, the ability to control territory did not decrease the likelihood of foreign support; instead, it was found to be positively related to receiving support, possibly because it proves the group's viability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001373#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"General country-level characteristics, such as GDP per capita and overall military capacity (CINC), are not reliable predictors of whether rebel groups receive external support.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001373#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Democratic states are generally less likely to be the target of externally sponsored rebel groups compared to non-democracies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001373#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The presence of a strong central command did not increase the likelihood of receiving support, contradicting the expectation that such structures make rebels more reliable agents for state patrons.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001373#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Indonesia","Colombia","Chad","Libya","South Africa","Angola","Mozambique","Sudan","Uganda","Iran","Iraq","Nicaragua","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Rwanda","Turkey","Sri Lanka","Afghanistan","Ethiopia","Philippines"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","principal-agent framework","logistic regression"]},{"id":"prio-001386","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001386","title":"Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/0d24b4d6-a0a8-4050-935c-e0261a8a53a2/Fighting at Home Fighting Abroad How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research demonstrates that states experiencing civil wars are significantly more likely to be involved in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Using data from 1946 to 2001, the authors find that this 'civil peace' effect is comparable in magnitude to the 'democratic peace' effect. Analysis of over 400 MIDs reveals that the increased risk is driven by states attempting to influence the outcome of civil wars through direct intervention, externalization (such as cross-border counter-insurgency), and unintended spillovers, rather than by opportunistic attacks on weakened states or diversionary wars to consolidate domestic power.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001386#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Civil wars significantly increase the probability of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between states, with the effect being similar in magnitude to the 'democratic peace' effect.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001386#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The increased risk of interstate conflict associated with civil wars is primarily driven by efforts to influence the civil war's outcome through intervention, externalization, and spillovers, rather than unrelated issues.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001386#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Empirical data shows that the annual rate of MID onsets in dyads with a COW civil war (4.3%) is more than double the rate in dyads without a civil war (2.1%).","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001386#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"States experiencing civil wars are more likely to both initiate MIDs against other states and be the targets of MIDs initiated by others.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001386#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The 'surplus' of MIDs associated with civil wars can be entirely explained by cases of intervention, externalization, and spillover, suggesting that opportunism and diversion do not significantly increase the net rate of international conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001386#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Externalization occurs when governments in civil wars conduct cross-border counter-insurgency raids or retaliatory attacks against neighbors supporting rebels.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001386#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Intervention is driven by states with conflicting preferences over the civil war's outcome, motivated by proxy wars, regime disputes, irredentism, protection of ethnic kin, or tit-for-tat retaliation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001386#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Spillover effects, such as mass refugee migration and border fortification, can lead to the militarization of interstate relations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001386#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The research finds that regime transitions (democratization) by themselves do not promote interstate disputes in the absence of civil wars, contradicting the 'dangerous democratization' thesis.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001386#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Chad","Sudan","Israel","Lebanon","Vietnam","Iraq","Iran","Ethiopia","Eritrea","Pakistan","India","Serbia","Croatia","Bosnia and Herzegovina","Sri Lanka","Sierra Leone","Liberia","Libya","Myanmar","Thailand","Morocco","Algeria","Mauritania","Rwanda","Uganda","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Tanzania","Burundi","Haiti","United States"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","case narrative analysis","dyadic analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001392","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001392","title":"Ties that Bias in International Conflict","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/a6555be0-217a-4ef2-a5e5-da9834174459/final_GG_ties.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The authors argue that traditional dyadic analysis of international conflict often ignores spatial dependence, where the risk of conflict in one pair of states is influenced by the status of other linked pairs. They introduce new measures for 'third-party' and 'fourth-party' alliance ties, as well as a theory of geographic 'inbetweenness,' to demonstrate that dyads linked to ongoing disputes through these pathways are significantly more likely to experience conflict onset. Using data from 1950-1992, the study finds that these extra-dyadic factors provide a substantially better fit for predicting conflict than purely dyadic models.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001392#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The odds of a dispute onset are approximately 3.14 times higher for dyads connected to an ongoing dispute via third- or fourth-party alliance ties compared to those without such ties.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001392#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Third-party alliance ties have a stronger effect on conflict risk than fourth-party ties, increasing the odds of a dispute by a factor of 8.25, while fourth-party ties increase them by 2.75.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001392#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Geographic 'inbetweenness' significantly raises conflict risk; a third-party inbetweenness ratio of 1 is associated with a nearly 27-fold increase in the odds of a dispute compared to a ratio of 0.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001392#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Fourth-party inbetweenness increases the odds of a dispute by a factor of 14.3 for dyads with contiguous capitals and a maximum inbetweenness ratio of 1, relative to those with a ratio of 0.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001392#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Including extra-dyadic ties in the model significantly alters the estimated impact of other variables: the coefficient for major power status is reduced by nearly 45%, while the negative effect of bilateral alliances increases by almost 35%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001392#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The expanded model with extra-dyadic ties is more effective at identifying actual disputes, correctly flagging 88 out of 1,078 cases at a 0.5 probability threshold, compared to 57 cases in the baseline model.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001392#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["United Kingdom","Albania","Yugoslavia","Germany","Netherlands","Poland","Soviet Union","Estonia","Iraq","Kuwait"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","spatial econometrics","network analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001410","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001410","title":"Gender Gap or Gender Bias in Peace Research?","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/8d21b889-e6d6-42c8-98ac-7bba12514af3/Gender Gap or Gender Bias in Peace Research Publication Patterns for Journal of Peace Research 1983-2008.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study analyzes data from the Journal of Peace Research (JPR) from 1983 to 2008 to examine the gender gap in academic publishing. While the authors find a clear but declining gender gap in the number of submissions and published articles, they find no evidence of significant gender bias in the acceptance process or in citation counts. The results suggest that the observed productivity gap is not driven by editorial bias, and that co-authorship positively influences both publication success and citation impact regardless of gender.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001410#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"There is a significant gender gap in the authorship of the Journal of Peace Research, though it has decreased over time. Female authorship rose from below 10% in the 1980s to approximately 20% in the 1990s, and was approaching 40% by 2008.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001410#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The gender gap in publications appears to mirror a similar gap in submissions, suggesting that the disparity is a reflection of the broader profession rather than editorial bias.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001410#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The study found no evidence that the transition from a single-blind to a double-blind review policy significantly altered the submission-acceptance ratio for women.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001410#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Articles with at least one female author are slightly more likely to be published than those with only male authors, but this is largely attributed to the positive effect of co-authorship rather than gender itself.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001410#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Gender is not a significant determinant of citation rates for articles published in the journal.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001410#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Co-authorship and specific article types have a stronger influence on citations than author gender; specifically, co-authored articles and 'Special Data Features' receive significantly more citations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001410#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","logistic regression","negative binomial regression"]},{"id":"prio-001435","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001435","title":"Sins of Omission and Commission","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/cfee6b9e-103d-458a-bbdd-63ec54249ed8/Hanne Fjelde PhD.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document argues that government behavior, rather than just structural factors, determines the risk of civil conflict. It distinguishes between 'sins of omission'—the failure to provide political goods and protect property rights—and 'sins of commission'—the use of patronage politics to co-opt opponents. The author finds that while patronage and corruption generally increase conflict risk, they can actually enhance regime resilience in oil-rich states by bribing potential rebels. Additionally, the research highlights that single-party authoritarian regimes are more resilient to armed conflict than military or multi-party autocracies. In Nigeria, the study finds that non-state conflict is driven by political and economic competition for state patronage rather than ethnic or religious animosity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Single-party authoritarian regimes are more resilient to armed conflict than multi-party or military autocracies because their institutional setup allows for more efficient coercive strategies and the co-optation of opponents.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The risk of civil conflict in multi-party electoral autocracies decreases over time following a regime transition, whereas for military regimes, the risk is initially lower but increases over time.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"High levels of government spending on political goods and the presence of trustworthy institutions are stronger predictors of civil peace than the state's extractive capacity to project force and collect revenue.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In oil-rich countries, political corruption can act as a tool for co-optation, where governments use oil wealth to buy off rivals and reward followers, thereby reducing the risk of conflict compared to what would be expected from corruption and oil dependence alone.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-state armed conflict in Nigeria between 1991 and 2005 was driven by political and economic factors related to the state's administrative organization and the distribution of oil wealth, rather than religious or ethnic animosity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In Nigeria, areas characterized by oil production and high income levels are more likely to experience more intense non-state conflicts with higher numbers of battle deaths.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Government failure can be categorized into 'sins of omission,' such as failing to protect property rights, and 'sins of commission,' such as the illegitimate use of public office for personal gain through patronage politics.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001435#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["governance"],"geography_discussed":["Nigeria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","cross-country statistical analysis","sub-national analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001477","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001477","title":"Inequality and Conflict in Federations","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/45ea5ced-8bce-4b77-8cbd-49b9ac6ff57d/Inequality and Conflict in Federations.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The authors use geo-coded data from 31 federal states to argue that both relatively rich and relatively poor regions are more prone to secessionist conflict than those with average wealth. The study also finds that the presence of politically excluded ethnic groups and the existence of regional autonomy further elevate the risk of violent secessionist conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001477#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Regional economic inequality is robustly associated with the onset of secessionist conflict, with both relatively affluent and underdeveloped regions facing a higher risk than those close to the national average.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001477#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The presence of politically excluded ethnic groups within a region significantly increases the likelihood of that region experiencing secessionist conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001477#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regional autonomy for the largest excluded ethnic group further increases the probability of secessionist conflict, as autonomous institutions can provide resources and entrench identities that fuel separatism.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001477#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The relationship between regional inequality and secessionist conflict persists regardless of whether a state is a federation or a non-federation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001477#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Control variables indicate that higher national population density and higher national GDP per capita are associated with an increased likelihood of secessionist conflict, while a history of prior conflict in a specific administrative unit also raises the risk.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001477#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["World","Biafra","Punjab","Slovenia","Croatia","Quebec","Ontario","Autonomous Region of Bougainville","Chechnya"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","logistic regression","cross-national comparative study"]},{"id":"prio-001487","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001487","title":"Introducing the Strategies of Resistance Data Project","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/06d8a550-3809-4940-9902-28cfba5a4351/Introducing the Strategies of Resistance data project.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP) provides a global dataset of 1,124 organizations involved in self-determination disputes between 1960 and 2005. Unlike previous datasets that focus on mass campaigns or violent actors, SRDP uses the organization as the unit of analysis to track tactical shifts. Findings indicate that nonviolent tactics are more common than violence in these movements, and organizations are more likely to switch from violence to nonviolence than vice versa.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001487#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The SRDP dataset includes 1,124 organizations involved in movements for national self-determination across 76 countries and 138 movements between 1960 and 2005.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001487#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Nonviolent tactics are more prevalent than violent tactics among organizations in self-determination movements; 40% of organizations used nonviolent tactics at some point, compared to approximately 30% that employed violence against the state.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001487#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A significant portion of organizations employ a diversity of tactics, with about 15% using both violent and nonviolent tactics in the same year.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001487#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of tactical switching reveals that organizations are more likely to transition from violence to nonviolence than from nonviolence to violence, contradicting the assumption that actors simply 'resort' to violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001487#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A comparison with the NAVCO 2.0 dataset shows that the majority of resistance activity occurs outside of large-scale mass campaigns; nearly 70% of nonviolent and 54% of violent organization-years in SRDP took place outside the context of a NAVCO campaign.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001487#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The SRDP categorizes nonviolent tactics into five distinct types: economic noncooperation, protest and demonstration, nonviolent intervention, social noncooperation, and political noncooperation.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001487#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"At the organization level, a higher degree of movement fragmentation is associated with a switch from violence to nonviolence, but not with a switch from nonviolence to violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001487#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"At the movement level, the presence of at least one organization demanding independence is associated with a decreased likelihood of stopping nonviolence and an increased likelihood of ceasing violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001487#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Spain","Morocco","Myanmar","Bangladesh","Ethiopia","Comoros","Chile","Nicaragua","Iraq","Algeria","Canada","Belgium","Moldova","Slovakia","Indonesia","Thailand"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","dataset introduction","multinomial logistic modeling"]},{"id":"prio-001506","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001506","title":"Justice during armed conflict: A new dataset on government and rebel strategies","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/6b139e81-28a9-4f2f-92e6-ac563715f2a1/Justice during Armed Conflict A New Dataset on Government and Rebel Strategies.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The authors present the During-Conflict Justice (DCJ) dataset, which catalogues 2,205 justice processes across 204 internal armed conflicts in 108 countries between 1946 and 2011. The research identifies that DCJ is a common tool, appearing in over 60% of conflicts since WWII, with governments being the primary adopters (70.4%). The study finds that democratic governments are more likely to use DCJ, particularly trials, truth commissions, and reparations, compared to autocracies. Rebel groups tend to use DCJ more frequently when fighting democracies and as their own relative military strength increases. Analysis suggests that government-initiated DCJ is correlated with a reduction in battle deaths in the following year and a higher likelihood of the conflict ending in a negotiated settlement rather than a military victory.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001506#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The During-Conflict Justice (DCJ) dataset covers 2,205 justice processes across 204 internal armed conflicts in 108 countries from 1946 to 2011, revealing that over 60 percent of conflicts since the Second World War included at least one DCJ process.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001506#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Governments are the dominant users of DCJ, initiating 70.4% of all processes, while rebel groups are responsible for 10.3%. Rebels are more likely to employ trials, purges, and amnesties than capacity-intensive processes like reparations and truth commissions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001506#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Democratic governments are more likely to utilize DCJ than anocracies or autocracies, particularly in the use of trials, truth commissions, and reparations to investigate and remedy wrongdoings involving civilians.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001506#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The use of trials has increased significantly since 1946, with a notable rise in the mid-1990s that exceeds the overall increase in the number of ongoing armed conflicts, aligning with the 'justice cascade' theory.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001506#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is an inverse relationship between rebel strength and government DCJ use; as rebels become stronger, government use of DCJ decreases. Conversely, rebel use of DCJ increases as they gain strength and capacity.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001506#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Government-initiated DCJ is associated with a decrease in conflict intensity; 38% of conflict years with government DCJ saw a reduction in battle deaths the following year, compared to 19% for years without such processes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001506#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The likelihood of a conflict ending in a negotiated settlement doubles when the government initiates at least one DCJ process, while the likelihood of a military victory decreases from 37% to 23%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001506#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Uganda","Sri Lanka","Thailand","Israel","Peru","Guatemala","Ethiopia","Bangladesh","India","Haiti","Angola","Liberia","Rwanda","Nepal","Middle East","Europe","Asia","Africa","Americas"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","dataset introduction","cross-national study"]},{"id":"prio-001553","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001553","title":"Mediation as politics: How nations leverage peace engagements?","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/d8c0bfa7-b59e-4141-8884-61be0dc3d1d3/Mediation as Politics How Nations Leverage Peace Engagements Pre-print.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The author argues that mediation is not merely a tool for conflict resolution but a strategic foreign policy instrument that allows middle powers to create 'extra political power space'. By engaging in mediation, these states can build stronger Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), create issue linkages for 'logrolling' with senior allies, and establish network ties. The paper illustrates this through an analysis of Turkey's mediation efforts under the AK Party government between 2002 and 2011, suggesting that Turkey leveraged its role as a peace broker to secure alliance benefits from the US and consolidate domestic political power.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001553#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Mediation serves as a foreign policy strategy for middle powers to create an additional space of political power that is not otherwise available, which can then be used to influence domestic and international relations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001553#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Middle powers can generate political leverage through three primary mechanisms: building strong BATNAs (Best Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement) for competitive advantage, creating issue linkages for cooperative 'logrolling', and establishing links to network partners to act as brokers.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001553#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In the context of alliance politics, independent mediation initiatives that do not align with a superpower's interests can help a junior partner build a strong BATNA to extract concessions from its partner.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001553#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Conversely, mediation that complements a senior partner's interests can be used as a cooperative strategy to secure existing financial and political support or to enhance trust and commitment.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001553#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Between 2002 and 2011, Turkey's mediation activities increased, with third-party roles rising from 8% of foreign policy actions (2002-2007) to 14% (2007-2011), primarily focused in the Middle East, Balkans, Africa, and the Caucasus.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001553#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The AK Party government used its role as a peace broker to complement US interests in Muslim geographies, which in turn helped Turkey secure US support for EU membership negotiations, the resolution of the Cyprus issue, and financial matters, contributing to an average annual economic growth rate of 7.5% between 2002 and 2011.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001553#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Turkey's mediation efforts involving Iran, Brazil, and the EU served to establish it as a critical link between the West and Iran, enhancing its relations with Trans-Atlantic partners.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001553#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["United States","European Union","Middle East","Balkans","Africa","Caucasus","Iran","Brazil","Syria"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["theoretical model","case study","quantitative analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001623","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001623","title":"Onset of Armed Conflict: A New List for the period 1946–2004, with Applications","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/48029a5d-4a06-4be4-ad9c-c37835dde4e0/Onset and Duration Manuscript.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The author presents a new list of conflict onsets based on the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD), designed to address the lack of robustness in conflict literature caused by arbitrary coding decisions. The dataset allows researchers to vary the casualty threshold (\u0001) and the minimum period of peace required before a new conflict is coded between old adversaries (\u0002). To demonstrate the utility of this framework, the author re-analyzes the findings of Hegre et al. (2001). The results indicate that while the effect of proximity to regime change on conflict risk is robust across different definitions, the perceived war-proneness of semi-democratic regimes is not robust and varies depending on the onset definition used.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001623#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The new dataset provides a more inclusive list of 275 conflict onsets, significantly higher than the 127 and 145 onsets found in datasets by Fearon & Laitin (2003) and Sambanis (2004), respectively.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001623#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The author proposes a flexible operational definition of conflict onset where the casualty threshold (\u0001) and the intermittency threshold (\u0002), which can range from two to nine years, are adjustable by the user to test robustness.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001623#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"A re-analysis of Hegre et al. (2001) using the new framework shows that the relationship between proximity to regime change and the risk of conflict onset is robust, with a country experiencing recent regime change being 80-100% more likely to experience an onset.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001623#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The finding that semi-democratic regimes are more prone to conflict is not robust, as the results are dependent on the specific definition of onset used and the number of observations included.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001623#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Proximity to previous conflict, economic development, and population size are identified as consistently robust predictors of conflict onset across various model specifications.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001623#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The author argues for a 'country-day' design over the standard 'country-year' format to better distinguish between cause and consequence when events occur within the same year.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001623#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":[],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["methodological analysis","quantitative analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001629","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001629","title":"Interventions to improve refugee children’s access to education and quality learning: A scoping review of existing impact evaluations","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/45499745-8eba-42c7-b7c6-1fba4e20241b/Palik and Ostby Interventions to improve refugee childrens access to education and quality learning.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The scoping review identifies a critical shortage of robust quantitative evidence regarding refugee education interventions. Out of 1,873 screened articles, only eight met the strict methodological criteria for impact evaluation. Findings suggest that while cash transfers can increase the time children spend in school, they do not necessarily increase overall enrolment. Promising results for learning quality were found in early childhood development programmes, online game-based solutions, and language-enhanced physical education for second-language acquisition, as well as child and youth learning centres for literacy and numeracy in camp settings. The authors highlight significant gaps in research concerning the Global South, long-term impacts, and gender-specific needs for girls.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001629#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"There is a severe lack of rigorous quantitative research evaluating the impact of educational interventions for refugees; a search of 1,873 peer-reviewed articles published between 1990 and 2021 yielded only eight studies that met strict methodological inclusion criteria.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001629#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Cash transfer programmes, such as the 'No Lost Generation' initiative in Lebanon, can increase the amount of time refugee children spend in school and increase household education expenditures, but they do not provide evidence of increased overall school enrolment rates.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001629#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Second-language acquisition can be positively impacted by several different intervention types, including early childhood development (ECD) programmes, online game-based solutions, and language-enriched physical education classes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001629#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"In camp settings, specifically at Buramino Camp in Ethiopia, child and youth learning centres (CYLCs) were found to improve literacy and numeracy skills, with older children and boys showing more significant gains than younger children and girls.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001629#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The effectiveness of certain interventions, such as drama therapy, may depend on the length of time a refugee has stayed in the host community; one study showed significant mathematics improvement for newly arrived refugees, while a later randomised control trial for refugees with emotional and behavioural problems showed no significant difference in grades.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001629#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Community school (CS) practices that integrate multiple special services can improve academic outcomes (GPA) for both refugee and non-refugee students and may reduce the risk of dropout for English Language Learners through counselling and trauma-sensitive training.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001629#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["United States","Canada","Lebanon","Germany","Ethiopia","Turkey"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["scoping review","impact evaluation","quantitative analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001635","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001635","title":"Conflict Trends in Africa, 1989–2019","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/dc465d80-400e-4056-8350-2f27e19d5031/Palik Rustad Methi - Conflict Trends in Africa 1989-2019 PRIO Paper 2020.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The paper analyzes conflict dynamics in Africa from 1989 to 2019, noting a record high of 25 state-based conflicts in 2019, many of which are low-intensity or involve the Islamic State. While Africa faces rising non-state conflicts and one-sided violence, it also leads other regions in the number of definitive ceasefires and peace agreements. The study further details the growth of UN peacekeeping operations in the region from 1994 to 2018, highlighting a significant increase in troop deployment peaking in 2010.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001635#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Africa reached a record high of 25 state-based conflicts in 2019, including 11 civil wars and 14 internationalized civil wars, with 13 conflicts fought over territory.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001635#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The Islamic State (IS) is active in Africa, with nine countries experiencing conflicts with the group within their territories in 2019: Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia, and Mozambique.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001635#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Battle-related deaths in state-based conflicts in Africa increased from 6,799 in 2018 to 8,407 in 2019, marking the first increase since 2014, driven by escalations in Libya, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Mozambique, and Niger.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001635#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Africa has recorded the highest number of definitive ceasefires and peace agreements compared to other world regions, with 187 peace agreements between 1975 and 2018.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001635#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Non-state conflicts in Africa are predominantly communal conflicts; while the total number of non-state conflicts decreased from 49 in 2018 to 42 in 2019, battle-related deaths fell to 2,791, the lowest since 2012.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001635#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Africa accounts for the largest number of incidents of one-sided violence globally, and it is the only region showing an increase in non-state groups employing such violence.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001635#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"UN peacekeeping operations in Africa saw a steady increase in both the number of missions and troop sizes from 2002, with troop numbers peaking in 2010 at nearly 80,000 personnel across eight missions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001635#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Conflict in Africa is often geographically concentrated in hotspots, such as the Lake Chad region and eastern DR Congo, as well as newer hotspots like the Ambazonia region in Cameroon and the border between Mali and Burkina Faso.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001635#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Cameroon","Burkina Faso","Somalia","Burundi","Niger","Chad","Nigeria","Libya","Mali","Mozambique","Rwanda","Ethiopia","Eritrea","Democratic Republic of the Congo","South Sudan","Central African Republic","Ivory Coast","Liberia","Uganda","Sudan","Afghanistan","Syria","Yemen","Mexico","World"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","regional comparison","trend analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001636","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001636","title":"Conflict Trends in Asia, 1989–2019","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/5b35e65f-193a-4e63-bace-2f4be3210f77/Palik Rustad Methi - Conflict Trends in Asia 1989-2019 PRIO Paper 2020.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The document analyzes conflict dynamics in Asia from 1989 to 2019 using UCDP data. It finds that while state-based conflicts are generally declining and often low-intensity, Afghanistan remains a critical exception and the most violent setting in the region and the world. Asia recorded the highest absolute number of ceasefires globally between 1989 and 2018, but peace agreements have declined since 2006. Non-state conflicts in Asia are declining, contrary to global trends, while one-sided violence is generally decreasing but saw a recent increase in 2019 driven by Afghanistan.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001636#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"State-based conflicts in Asia have generally declined since the pre-Cold War period, with the number of such conflicts decreasing from 16 in 2018 to 15 in 2019. In 2019, these 15 conflicts occurred across six different countries and consisted of 12 civil wars, two internationalized civil wars, and one interstate war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001636#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Afghanistan is the primary driver of violence in Asia and globally. In 2019, it was the most violent conflict setting in the world, with battle-related deaths increasing from 25,679 in 2018 to 29,903 in 2019, largely due to the government's fight against the Taliban.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001636#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Asia recorded the highest absolute number of ceasefires of any world region between 1989 and 2018, totaling 679. The majority of these were related to peace processes (396), and the region showed a relatively high share of holiday-related ceasefires (130) compared to other regions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001636#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The number of peace agreements in Asia increased after 1987, peaking in 1997 and 2006 with seven agreements each, before entering a declining trend. Between 1975 and 2018, Asia had 63 peace agreements, with partial agreements (31) being the most common type.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001636#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Contrary to global trends, Asia has seen a general decline in non-state conflicts. While there was a slight increase from two conflicts in 2018 to three in 2019—including a new communal conflict in Papua New Guinea between the Oi Kuru and Libe Koi groups—battle-related deaths from non-state conflicts reached a record low of 141 in 2019.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001636#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"One-sided violence in Asia generally follows a declining trend for both government and non-state perpetrators, though fatalities increased from 2018 to 2019. This recent escalation was driven by the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan. Historically, the majority of one-sided violence in the region is perpetrated by non-state actors.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001636#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Geographically, conflicts in Asia are often concentrated in hotspots rather than spread across entire countries, with the exceptions of Afghanistan and the Philippines. Examples of hotspots include Kashmir and eastern central parts of India, the Rakhine and Kachin states in Myanmar, and the deep south of Thailand.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001636#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Afghanistan","India","Pakistan","Philippines","Myanmar","Papua New Guinea","Thailand","Indonesia","World"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","comparative analysis","trend analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001654","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001654","title":"Poverty, Inequality, and Conflict","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/1020840b-334f-4d09-ac8e-b393bfccf36d/Poverty Inequality and Conflict.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The authors argue that national-level GDP per capita is an ambiguous proxy for the drivers of civil war, as conflict is typically a localized phenomenon. Using a global grid of 0.5-degree cells and G-Econ data for 1990, they test three hypotheses: that poorer areas are more prone to conflict (H1), that pockets of wealth in poor countries attract insurgency (H2), and that deviations from national income averages increase risk (H3). Preliminary results indicate that conflict onsets are more likely in poorer areas of a state and that the relationship between Gross Cell Product (GCP) per capita and conflict risk follows an inverted U-shape, peaking at approximately $1,300 per capita.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001654#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The authors argue that national-level economic data are insufficient for explaining civil war because conflict is usually a localized event occurring in peripheral regions that may differ significantly from national averages.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001654#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Preliminary data analysis shows that both Gross Cell Product (GCP) per capita and national GDP per capita are lower for cells experiencing conflict onset compared to those that do not.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001654#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The study finds that most conflict locations have a local GCP per capita that is lower than the overall national GDP per capita, including in middle-income countries like Russia where conflicts in the Caucasus occur in very poor regions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001654#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Regression analysis suggests a non-linear relationship between local income and conflict risk, specifically an inverted U-shape where the highest risk of onset is found in cells with a GCP per capita of approximately $1,300.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001654#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"There is a statistically significant difference in conflict risk between the lowest and highest income cells; moving from the 10th to the 95th percentile of GCP per capita reduces the chance of onset by approximately 2%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001654#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Russia","Chechnya","Angola","Ethiopia","Spain","Israel"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","logistic regression","geospatial analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001682","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001682","title":"Regimes and Industrialization","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/2423fa96-4019-40ab-9b74-fbb149169003/Regimes and industrialization.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study finds that autocratic regimes are systematically associated with higher levels of industrialization, measured by railway freight, energy consumption, and manufacturing value added. The authors attribute this to three mechanisms: the narrow social bases of autocracies (which benefit industrial elites), heightened security concerns (driving military-industrial capacity), and the availability of coercive policy tools to override opposition to dislocating industrial reforms.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001682#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Autocratic regimes are more likely to adopt an economic development model centered on heavy industry due to differences in social bases, security concerns, and policy tools compared to democratic regimes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001682#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Autocracies have a significant advantage over democracies in promoting industrialization, which the authors describe as a marked exception to the typical 'democracy dividend' found in other policy outcomes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001682#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The narrow constituency base of autocracies provides an incentive to pursue industrial policies, as these policies can provide targeted economic benefits to powerful industrial elites whose support is essential for regime survival.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001682#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Security concerns in autocracies, including internal dissent and external threats, drive the development of industrial capacity, particularly in transport infrastructure and heavy manufacturing like iron and steel, to enhance military capability.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001682#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Autocratic regimes possess greater capabilities to implement aggressive industrialization because they can use coercion to override opposition from civil society and infringe upon property rights to build infrastructure.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001682#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Empirical tests using a global dataset show a negative relationship between democracy (measured by Polyarchy stock) and three of four industrialization indicators: railway freight, energy consumption, and manufacturing value added.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001682#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The relationship between autocracy and industrialization is not merely a result of the experiences of Communist countries or specific regions like East Asia, as results remained stable when these were omitted from the sample.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001682#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"While autocracies may excel at industrialization, this does not necessarily translate to higher GDP per capita growth, as industrial policies can be ineffective or expensive 'boondoggles'.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001682#insight-8","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The authors' findings are consistent with other research showing that democracies provide better public goods and higher wages, suggesting that autocracies prioritize industrial investment over broad social welfare.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001682#insight-9","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["industrial policy","heavy industry","industrial manufacturing","infrastructure","economic development"],"geography_discussed":["England","Prussia","South Korea","Soviet Union","People's Republic of China","Japan","Taiwan","Ghana","Zaire","India"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["cross-national panel study","quantitative analysis","historical analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001701","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001701","title":"Resolving Civil Wars before they Start: The UN Security Council and Conflict Prevention in Self-Determination Disputes","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/9b582245-5d5e-4085-aff6-21c31ba863b9/Resolving Civil Wars before They Start The UN Security Council and Conflict Prevention in Self-Determination Disputes.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The study analyzes 142 self-determination movements across 77 countries to determine the preventive effects of UNSC actions. It finds that direct diplomatic engagement significantly reduces the probability of armed conflict onset. Additionally, while direct force and sanctions show limited or positive correlations with conflict, indirect authorizations of force and sanctions—those applied in a broader regional or state-wide context—act as powerful deterrents, reducing the likelihood of civil war for related self-determination groups.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001701#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Direct diplomatic engagement by the UNSC is strongly associated with a decrease in the likelihood of armed conflict in self-determination disputes. Specifically, periods immediately following resolutions containing instructions for diplomatic measures are estimated to be about 60 percent less likely to experience the onset of armed conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001701#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Indirect authorizations of new force and sanctions—resolutions that do not explicitly name a specific self-determination movement but address a broader regional or state-wide conflict—have significant deterrent effects. Indirect force authorizations almost entirely eliminate the likelihood of conflict onset, while indirect sanctions reduce it by approximately 40 percent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001701#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Direct authorizations of new force do not show a statistically significant preventive effect, and direct sanctions are actually positively correlated with an increased likelihood of civil war.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001701#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Passive UNSC actions, including simple condemnations and the reauthorization of existing force mandates, do not have a statistically significant relationship with the onset of armed conflict.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001701#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The preventive effect of diplomacy is not merely a result of managing existing conflicts, as the effect remains robust when the sample is limited to self-determination movements that had never previously participated in a civil war.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001701#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Several state and group-level factors correlate with the likelihood of civil war: increased numbers of movement factions, the presence of ethnic kin groups in neighboring states, and a higher total number of self-determination groups within a state all increase the probability of conflict. Conversely, democracy and higher GDP per capita are associated with a lower likelihood of onset.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001701#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["North Macedonia","Cyprus","Afghanistan","Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia","Democratic Republic of the Congo","South Africa","Nicaragua","Iran","Iraq"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","event-history modeling","logit regression"]},{"id":"prio-001708","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001708","title":"Revolution, Elite Fear and Electoral Institutions","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/3050eab5-4eda-40e4-89af-1efda5bcf518/Revolution Elite Fear and Electoral Institutions.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The authors argue that Proportional Representation (PR) is often adopted not due to electoral competition, but as a response to systemic threats of revolution. Using Norway's 1919 reform as a case study, they demonstrate that incumbents viewed PR as a de-radicalization tool to strengthen parliamentary legitimacy and isolate revolutionary radicals. Quantitative analysis of roll-call votes shows that MPs facing local industrial conflicts and soldiers' councils were significantly more likely to support PR, regardless of the actual electoral strength of socialist parties in their districts.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001708#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The 'systemic threat theory' posits that incumbents prioritize the long-term survivability of the political and economic system over their own short-term re-election; consequently, they may accept tactical seat losses through PR to prevent total systemic collapse.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001708#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The adoption of PR in Norway in 1919 was driven by elite perceptions of a revolutionary threat following the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, which led incumbents to use PR as a 'co-opting device' to strengthen the reformist wing of the Labor movement.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001708#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Reformist socialists shifted their preference from majoritarian systems to PR after 1918 because they needed immediate electoral victories to legitimize the parliamentary strategy against the rising influence of radicals who advocated for extra-parliamentary action.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001708#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Quantitative analysis of the 1919 roll-call vote indicates that MPs in constituencies with higher numbers of industrial conflicts were 31 percentage points more likely to vote for PR and 30 percentage points less likely to vote to postpone the decision.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001708#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The presence of soldiers' councils in an MP's district served as a strong signal of systemic threat, reducing the probability of voting to postpone the reform by 60% and increasing the probability of voting for PR by 41%.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001708#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The study finds that the drive for PR was distinct from 'electoral threat'; industrial conflicts and soldiers' councils did not show a systematic association with the actual 1921 vote shares of leftist parties.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001708#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Norwegian elites engaged in a dual strategy of repression and concession, establishing a secret security commission and a mobilization army of 5,000–8,000 men while simultaneously pursuing electoral reform to appease the working class.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001708#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Russia","Soviet Union","Europe","Switzerland","Germany","Belgium","Bulgaria","World"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","qualitative process tracing","comparative political analysis"]},{"id":"prio-001713","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001713","title":"Roving Bandits?","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/a357fdc5-9371-46b9-a7e8-9f81d51724d9/Roving Bandits The Geographical Evolution of African Armed Conflicts.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The research analyzes the geographical evolution of African civil wars using the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED). It argues that rebel groups with strong ethnic ties or significant military strength tend to maintain stable, localized conflict zones, whereas groups lacking these attributes—or those receiving external military support—are more likely to be 'roving.' The study finds that the greatest mobility occurs when rebels have neither strong local ties nor the strength to compete conventionally with government forces.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001713#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"Rebel groups that make ethnic claims tend to have more stable and localized conflict zones, as they prioritize consolidating control over a specific homeland and can better blend in with local populations.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001713#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"External military participation by outside actors is strongly associated with increased movement of conflict zones, as it reduces the rebel group's focus on cultivating local ties and hierarchies.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001713#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Conflict zones exhibit greater mobility when government forces possess dominant military strength, forcing weaker rebel groups to use mobility and guerrilla tactics for survival.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001713#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The highest degree of conflict zone mobility occurs when rebel groups lack both strong local ethnic ties and the military strength to compete with the state.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001713#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Proximity to non-coastal international borders increases the likelihood of conflict stationarity, as governments struggle to project power into peripheral regions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001713#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Empirical analysis of African conflict polygons shows significant overall movement; less than 45% of conflict areas in a given year overlap by more than 50% with the previous year's area.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001713#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":[],"geography_discussed":["Sudan","Uganda","Mali","Libya","Democratic Republic of the Congo","Central African Republic","Sri Lanka"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","spatial analysis","comparative case study"]},{"id":"prio-001818","url":"https://climateinsightsdirectory.org/document/prio-001818","title":"Urban Social Disorder 3.0: A global, city-level event dataset of political mobilization and disorder","publisher":{"name":"Peace Research Institute Oslo","organization":"peace-research-institute-oslo"},"document_type":"research paper","language":"en","date_published":null,"source_url":"https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/35628c8a-1cec-4e9f-ad1e-4cf70431ba4c/Thomson Bahgat Urdal Buhaug 2022 Urban Social Disorder 3 Global City-level Event Dataset of Political Mobilization and Disorder.pdf?inline=true","generator":"Climate Insights Directory","generated_fields":["summary","key_insights","climate_tags","geography_discussed","analysis_type"],"summary":{"text":"The authors present Urban Social Disorder 3.0, a global event dataset covering 186 cities from 1960-2014, containing 13,324 events. The study finds that global urban social disorder increased after the early 2000s, driven largely by Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Contrary to some previous research, the authors find a positive relationship between city population size and the frequency of lethal disorder events, while urban growth rates show no such association. The analysis also suggests that autocratic regimes may be more effective at suppressing lethal urban disorder than democratic ones.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001818#summary","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},"key_insights":[{"text":"The Urban Social Disorder 3.0 (USD) dataset comprises 13,324 events across 186 cities between 1960 and 2014, focusing primarily on national capitals and major urban centers with populations exceeding 100,000 in 2014.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001818#insight-1","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Global urban social disorder followed a trend of increasing frequency from the 1960s to the 1980s, experienced a decline in the 1990s, and rose again after the early 2000s, reaching an average of 26.7 total monthly events and 10.4 lethal monthly events by 2014.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001818#insight-2","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The post-2000 increase in global urban social disorder was primarily driven by growth in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, while Latin America saw a decline.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001818#insight-3","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Organized demonstrations are the most common type of urban social disorder globally (29.1%), followed by armed attacks (18.1%), while inter-communal warfare (0.6%) and pro-government demonstrations (1.5%) are the least frequent.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001818#insight-4","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Analysis of the global sample reveals a positive and significant association between city population size and the rate of urban disorder, although the rate of urban population growth is not associated with the outcome.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001818#insight-5","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"The study suggests a 'global autocratic peace,' indicating that authoritarian regimes are often more effective at discouraging public dissent and avoiding lethal urban social disorder than democratic regimes.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001818#insight-6","date_modified":"2026-10-23"},{"text":"Lethal urban disorder is strongly linked to ongoing civil conflict, economic shocks, and lower income levels across various regions.","ai_generated":true,"unit":"prio-001818#insight-7","date_modified":"2026-10-23"}],"climate_tags":["urbanization","food security","climate change"],"geography_discussed":["Asia","Middle East","Africa","Europe","Latin America","Baghdad","London","Beirut","Paris"],"frame_perspective":[],"analysis_type":["quantitative analysis","dataset introduction","longitudinal study","regression analysis"]}]}